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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
India is a developing country. Developmental 
process has Its own dynamics and problems. iVhen science 
and technology are increasingly employed in producing 
goods and services calculated to improve the quality of 
life, there is certain element of hazard or risk inherent 
in the very use of science and tecnnology and it is not 
possible to totally eliminate such hazards or risk alto-
getner. It is also not possible to adopt a policy of not 
having any chemical or other hazardous industries merely 
because they pose hazard or risk to the community. If 
such a policy were adopted, it would mean the and of all 
progress and development. Such industries, even if hazar-
dous have to be set up since they are essential for economic 
development and advancement of well being of the people. 
An enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or in-
herently dangerous industry which poses a potential threat 
to tne health and safety of the persons working in the 
factory owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the com-
munity to ensure tnat no har^ ri results to anyone on account 
o 
u 
hazardous or iniierently dangerous nacure of activity which 
it has undertaken. The enterprise must be held to be 
under an obligation ro provide that the hazardous activity 
in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest 
standards of safety and if any harm results on account of 
such activity the enterprise must be absolutely liable to 
compensate for such harm. 
Industrial accidents and diseases "are far more 
frequent and far more damaging, than most people not 
directly concerned in industry realise; public is shocked 
from time to time by mass disaster but it is scarecely 
aware of the endless toll of death, suffering and hardship 
caused by day to day accidents which kill or injure 'only 
a few, at a time but many in all- all that no means only 
in the so-called dangerous trade. In terms of human misery, 
suffering and domestic hardship, these injuries are terrible, 
and in mere economic terms the loss of productive power and 
of production involved is serious. Under the circumstances 
the state can not remain a helpless spectator in this state 
of affairs. 
The very basis of society and civilized forms of 
government is the innate urge of man for social security; 
a guarantee for safety and sustenance for life of oneself 
0 
and his faunily in aays of hardship. Etomologically, 
'social security' refers to the protection which 
society furnishes througn appropriate organisation 
against certain risks to which its members are exposed 
to the need for social security was felt, because the 
earning capacity of a person can reduce or stop at any 
time/ and contingencies of deprivation would arise which 
are beyond the control or the individual. In such cir-
cumstances it is considered the auty of the State and 
the society of which the individual is a member,to help 
nim from being destitute and to assist him to be socially 
non-dependant. 
International Labour organisation played a signi-
ficant role in evolving universally acceptable ^^ ,rinciple 
ana scandards of social security and influenceu the 
countries to take leviolative measures in respect of com-
pensation for industrial injuries. rience provisions of 
compensation to workers for industrial accidents has 
become an important part of labour legislation in every 
country and in many countries it is included under social 
insurance schemes. The compensation system granting dis-
ablement and dependent benefits was the first step towards 
social security all over the world. Compensation goes to 
income security and is "based upon the idea that during 
spells of risks, the individual ana his family snould not 
be subjected to a double calamity, involving both desti-
tution and loss of health/ life- or work. 
Payment of compensation can be supported both on 
hiomanitarian and economic grounds. On the one hand, it 
is a recognition of the value of the numan life and, on 
the other hand gives the worker a sense of security, increase 
his efficiency and makes the industrial work attractive. It 
also makes the employers careful about providing adequate 
safeguards against such accidents and induces them to make 
adequate medical treatment facilities for the labourers. 
It hds also been recognised that the workers right to com-
pensation is the same, whether the undertaking is large or 
small, whether the work carried on is considerea a dangerous 
one involving an insignificant risk, whether the undertaking 
be inuustrial, commercial or agricultural, whether the 
worker's ^^ ay is .nigh or low, whether or not ne is manual 
worker, and finally whether he is the victx-a of an inaus-
trial accicent or occupational disease. 
The enactment of compensation legislation in other 
countries and agitation in 1920 for compensation legislation 
in India led to the passing of the Workmen's Compensation 
^ct, 1923. It is a social welfare legislation aimed at 
achieving the constitutional goal set by -rorticle 41. 
.1 
The V.'orkmen's Compensation «.ct is a mechanism 
for providing relief to victims of work-connected in-
juries. It places the cost of these injuries only upon 
the employer which ultimately lies on the consumers of 
the product. The origin of the compensation system is 
to be found in the idealist philosophy that many of the 
misfortunes/ disabilities and accidents of individuals are 
ultimately social and not individual in origin. Theoreti-
cally, statutory liability to pay compensation to the in-
jured workman is fixed on the employer for two reasons, 
i'irstly, the workman had been contributing to the employers 
occupation, business/ or trade and consequently the employer 
should compensate for the loss suffered by the worker on 
account of injury caused while in the discharge of the work 
of the employer. Secondly, the product of workman's labour 
go for the consumption and comfort of the society which he 
serves and as such the hazard and risk he undertakes in 
the discharge of his duties is society's concern. The 
legal presumption accepts the theory that the law will permit 
tne employer to carry on the business and trade on condition 
that he assumes the liability for any consequent injury to 
the work;nan, which results from occupational risks and 
industrial hazards for no fault on the employer's part. 
The basic operating principle of the «ct is tnat 
a workman is entitled to compensation for work injuries 
whenever he suffers a "personal injury by an accident 
arising out OL and in the course of employment". The 
employer's liability under this scheme is not based on 
negligence or fault because it does not lessoa M s liabi-
lity. The workmen's compensation scheme is, therefore, 
neither a branch of law of tort nor social insurance of 
the British type; it bears some of the characterii.tic of 
each. Like tort but unlike social insurance, its operative 
mechanism Is unilateral employer's liability with no con-
tribution by the employers or the State. Like social insu-
rance but unlike tort, the right to compensation and amount 
of compensation are based largely on a social theory of pro-
viding support and preventing destitution, rather than 
setting accounts between two individuals according to their 
1 
personal blame. 
The t^t. also eliminates the hardship experienced under 
the common law system, by providing prompt payment of com-
pensation with a minimum of legal formality. 
But despite all virtues the Act is found wanting 
whenever a complicated situation arose. Opinion differs 
and injxired humanity suffers not only due to carelessness, 
indifference and utter disregard of the governmental machi-
nery but also because of workmen's own negligence. 
1, Krishnan P.G.:"Social security workmen's Compensation,xiii, 
C.U.L.R,, June,1989 
In i n t e r p r e t i n g the p rov is ions of the ^c t the 
d i f f e r e n t High Courts took d ivergent views. Some gives 
i t a s t r i c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n with a p o s i t i v i s t approach, 
narrowing the r i g h t of the employee to claim and scxne 
gives i t a b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n taking a soc io logica l 
view of the fac t s and circvrnstances, in consonance with 
the s p i r i t of the s t a t u t e , widening the l i a b i l i t y of the 
employer. The Su^jreme Court took tne view tha t i t i s very 
important to enunciate the p r i n c i p l e s of law in accordance 
with tne s p i r i t orna ^^hilosophy of the s t a t u t e . Tne f i r s t 
2 
repor ted judgment of the Supreme Court narrowly in t e rp re t ed 
t h i s branch of law but the second one promised i t a 
l i b e r a l outlook which would be more in tune with the s p i r i t 
and philosophy of such l e g i s l a t i o n . Courts have, thus in 
r ecen t years beg^n to take a l i b e r a l view in applying the 
p rov is ions of tne ^c t to meet the requirements oi soc ia l 
j u s t i c e , both in r e l a t i o n to imposit ion of l i a b i l i t y on 
tiie employer, and in widening the scope of the r i g h t s of 
the workmen. 
3ut these l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s does not serves 
a l l the purpose and the /*ct needs improvements on many 
f r o n t s . 
The broad purpose of the law i s to meet the needs, 
demands, c la ims, des i r e s and expec ta t ions of the injured 
Y' Saurashtra s a l t Manufacturing Co.v. Bai Valu Raja, 
rt.I.R. 1958, S.C. 881 
3. General Manager 5.E.5.T. Undertaking v. Mrs. i->.gnes, 
/».!..<. 1964, S.C. 193 
labourers and to provide Gandhian goal of social 
and economic justice which according to Justice 
V.R. Krishna Iyer should not be undermined at any 
rate. 
Keeping in view the broad purpose of the law 
an attempt has been made in this work to study the 
law relating to extent of em^jloyer's liaoility under 
workmen's Compensation Act/ 1923. 
This work not only deals with/ the historicity 
of compensation laws* the law relating to employers 
liability to pay compensation , the most essential condi-
tions for employer's liability but also deals with the 
notional extension of the employer's premises and the 
amount of compensation and time OLf payment resulting from 
judicial delineation of legislative prescription. 
Chapter - I traditionaly deals with the 
historicity of the compensation laws. Its German 
origination and subsequent development as a measure 
of social security in England and India is discussed 
with essential details. 
Chapter -II particularly deals with the law 
relating to employer's liability to pay compensation. 
u 
The condition precedent for the employer's liability 
is the industxial accident which must have resulted 
in personal inj ury to the workman. There are certain 
exception where employers will not be liable for the 
wrongs or employees. The discussion not only covers 
industrial acciuents but occupational diseases as well 
causing such personal injury which may result in dis-
ability. 
Chapter-Ill covers the most essential condition 
for employer's liability i.e. personal injury must arise 
out of and in the course of employment. The phrase 
received greatest amount of judicial attention but remains 
elusive to any precise definition. An attempt has been 
made in this Chapter to delineate the scope of the phrase 
with the help of decided cases. 
Conveniently the Chapter is parted into two. One 
dealing with the term "arising out of" and second with 
the term "in the course of employment". Uoctrine of added 
peril places a workman in a disadvantageous position 
giving him no relief because of his own added peril to the 
employment. 
Chapter-IV. The land mark judgment in Saurashtra 
Salt Mfg.Co. case marks a new begining in another area 
of workmen's compensation, vrtiich till then was left un-
touched because of narrow interpretations given to the 
provision of tne wor>jnen's Compensation i-^ct. The judgment 
f) 
extended the scope of the Act so as to cover injuries 
though not caused witnin the premises of the employer 
but outside of it. Commencement and cessation of 
employer's liability is discussed so as to clarify the 
concept of notional extension theory. 
Chapter-V deals with the amount of compensation 
and time for its payment. Once a workman gets injured 
he must be given prompt monitory support by the employer. 
Employer will be punished for any default. Unless, the 
amount and time of payment is delineated employer's 
liability is meaningless. 
Conclusion and Suggestions based on close moni-
toring of tlie working of the Act and its judicial deli-
neation, marks the end of this dissertorial journey. 
C h a p t e r - i * 
* LrtW OF WORKi-iEl^'S COMPENSATIOIJ : * 
* * 
* OaiGIl^ AND D 2 V E L 0 P M E : 4 T * 
* 
Or 
* 
* K K < * X * * * « X t * )t » < w * >r .t X v ^ k It k r ^ <• « * A x v < t .T A .< «• x < * .f T x * x A: >: T jr • * •. A : * x 
1 ' 
i i. 
LAW Or WORKl'lKi; ' 3 COMPEl.SATION ; ORIGIN &. DEVELOPMENT 
The problem of sustaining economically inactive 
persons has confronted commxanities from the very begining 
of human civilization. In ancient days, the protection 
against misfortune and resultant deprivation was given by 
the members of the family, whether it was migratory and 
nomadic ccmnunity or the civilized society under orgainised 
governments. With industrialism man's expectations from 
society, social institutions and the government also changed. 
Industrialisation carried with it the attendant health hazards 
and accidental injxiry, and consequent privations to indivi-
duals and families. As a result compensation payment was 
sought to be introduced in almost all mature legal systems 
for industrial accidents including occupational diseases. Ihe 
coinmon law developed the machinery for compensating personal 
injury. The industrial workers could under this law recover 
compensation for personal injuries in industrial occupation 
on proof of negligence of the employers. In civil law coun-
tries, compensatory relief was given for accidental or work 
injury. Under botn civil law and co..jnon law jurisaiction the 
clai... was based on the tneory of negligence and raulr liacility. 
Employer was never xinder any obligation to provide 
sustenance to economically inactive workmen. The 
ordinary doctrine of fault liability and negligence 
worked very harshly on the workers. The discontent 
among the exploited workers resulted in a movement for 
working class Solidarity clamouring for better working 
conditions. When the machine age came and the complexion 
of industrial activity changed, the individual worker 
came to be exposed more and more to industrial risk. The 
organised working class began bargaining effectively for 
better working conditions. It was soon realised that 
the responsibility of the government towards the members 
of the society it governed, extended not only to policing 
and civil administration, but also to look after the 
welfare of the work-force which contributed to the material 
needs of society. Kautilya declared that: 
The king (State) shall provide the 
orphans (bala), the aged, the infirm, 
the afflicted and the helpless with 
maintenance. He shall also provide 
subsistence to helpless women when 
they are carrying and, also to the 
children they give birth to.1 
Governments, influenced by the ideological currents of 
political and social democracy in western societies, and 
1. Kautilya's Arthshastra 47 (7th Ed. translated by 
Dr. R. Shamshtry 196 ), 
1.) 
by the impact of international working class move-
ment, brought forward legislation that gave emphasis 
for social seciirity to workmen. Concept of welfare-
state, the International Labour Organisation conventions 
and the international trade union movement gave momentum 
to the process. 
By an awakened sense of social justice it was 
theorised that industrial occupations created an environ-
ment of risk and injury and consequent loss to the 
workers. The loss so sustained by the victim is an 
account of the discharge of his dkity towards the employer, 
and hence the liability to compensate the wage earner 
shjuid be tixed on tnc employer. xhij dwarenes:> led 
governments to take iejisiutivc action and. t.ie workinen' 3 
compensation system came in as tne lirst set oi social 
security law. .notwithstanding tne admonition of Kautilya, 
the primary responsibility for ^roviuing sustenance lies-' 
not on the otate buc, on the e.n^ l^oyer. It -.vili he useful 
nere to discuss the development oz co-.^ensaticn law in 
various countries separately. Because .listorical and 
cultural factors of ccu-nunitiss and econoiaic c:,;.ditions 
and ^^ olitical exigencies of a particular country playea 
an important role in t-'ie develo^ner.t of tiie co-.v^nsation 
law. 
r i - P G 5 i r i O J ^ liSi G2Ri-^ANY: 
The icea t-iat .nisfortunes, u i sa -^ i i i t i e s ana 
^cciuo;:t3 of ir .divioualo are t.-.e ^roduct oz 5.ci_.: 
i'i 
enviornments, was pointed out first by Fichte. Iron 
Chancellor, oismark/ gave to it the shape of appro-
priate legislation. He was the first among the European 
Statesman to understand fully the implications of the 
i'iarxist challenge and to take some steps towards fore-
stalling tne threatend revolution of workers enacted 
laws for their security in various fonas. In 1884 Ger-
many took the lead to provide monetary benefit to workmen 
for industrial injuries. Employers were made liable to 
pay compensation, to injured wokkinen for injuries suffered 
in the course of employment, irrespective of any fault 
or breach of duty on the part of the employers. German 
Act also made the cost of accidents as the liability on 
industry. It required employers to indemnify injured 
workmen, or in case of fatal accidents, their families, 
and it also set-up an insurance system under which the 
2 
employers were obliged to insure the risk. 
The German model accelarated the movement to-
wards enactment of workmen's compensation laws in other 
countries. Under the German cultural influence the 
compulsory method spread to other countries. 
5- POSITION IN EUGLAliDi 
/although Germany took the lead by passing first 
ever worknien' s compensation law, it is sufficient for 
2, Hallick, J.i... : Law of Workinen ' s Compensation in 
India, P. vii - viii 
i;» 
most purposes to look no fur ther back than 1897 when 
England a l so passed r^orkmen's Compensation ^ c t . Among 
common law coun t r i e s England was the r i r s t country to 
enacr such type of law. Since then i t has spread through-
out the. Commonwealth and the United S t a t e s . In England, 
me move.i.ent towards a lav; of wori-onen's compensation 
seeras to have been causea by broaa considera t ion ot j u s -
t i c e and humanity r a tne r tnan a motive of n e u t r a l i s i n g 
tne revolut ionery ^ .o^en t i a l i t i e s of the working c l a s s by 
3 
seeing ac t ive ly to t h e i r contentment. I t w i l l be u^^eful 
to r e c a l l b r i e f l y how andUwny a law of workmen's compensation 
came to be enacted in lingland and what purpose i t was 
intendeu t j starve. 
.•'ro:n ail c a r i y ^.ario.: u^ ^ t ^ tiit; ;r.ic:dle OL t-ic 
eigntcenta century, t.ie p o l i t i c a l aiiu economic pnilosophy 
nolding sway over iurope was 'mercanti l ism, according to 
wnicn 1 1 was ncc.jssary and „roper to exerc ise a s t r i c t 
con t rc l over ^^rivate e n t e r p r i s e . In England, taking tne 
sphere ^^ employment alone, there were laws regu la t ing 
tne condi t ions of apprent iceship and serv ice , f ix ing the 
r a t e s of wages ana r e s t r i c t i n g trie movement of lacour 
from one p a r t or the country t o another. gradual ly , a 
3. I d . , P. v i i i 
8 
reacrijn set in towards the middle oz the eighteenth 
century against this too mucn control of Government 
which was affecting the prosperity of the nation. 
This feeling led to the evolution of the doctrine of 
laissez faire whicn means "let things alone". The 
doctrine asserted that individual welfare was not in-
compatiable with national prosperity but, on the other 
hand/ welfare of the individual lay at the very founda-
tion of the prosperity of the nation and so the nation 
would be best served if the individual allowed to pursue 
nis self interest without restriction from outside for, 
in tnat event, he would put fortn his best efforts 
willingly and would thus become a more productive member 
of the society. The doctrine round a rapid and wide 
acceptance in England/ and it ushered in a period during 
which the agencies of production operated under condi-
tions of complete economic freedom. In the field of 
employment wages and other conditions of service were 
determined by free bargaining between the employer and 
employee. During the laissez faire period individual's 
destitution was considered either due to his own failures 
4 
or his own destiny. 
4. Ibid. 
i . 
The experiment with a policy of complete economic 
freedom was carried on for a considerable period but in 
the end, laissez faire, in txirns# began to reveal its 
own defects. Taking again the sphere of employment alone, 
it was found that not only were the employers imposing, 
in the name of freedom of contract, cruelly harsh terras 
on the employees who had no equal bargaining power and 
forcing them to work for vmconsciously long hours and under 
appalling conditions but the employees had even no adequate 
means of relief against the employers for injuries sustained 
in their service. For death or disablement by industrial 
accidents, the only legal remedy that a workman or his 
dependents could seek damages at cocnmon law, but that law 
having been evolved at an earlier stage of industrial de-
velopment to govern for simpler relations of master and 
servant afforded little real protection in the complicated 
circumstances of modern industry. At common law, workman^ 
claim could be allowed only if he was able to establish 
some negligence or breach of duty on the part of the em-
ployer as tne sole cause or tne accident resulting in the 
injury, but it was not easy to prove either of those torts. 
Apart from these hurdles the woriceman aad also to contend 
again the three doctrinal defences whicn the courts had 
evolved for tne j^ rotection or employers - namely, the doc-
trine of common employment, denying liability for the 
negligence of a fellow worker, the doctrine of contributory 
negligence denying liability where tne workman was partly 
IS 
responsible for n i s i n j u r i e s , ana tne doct r ine of volent i 
non f i t i n j u r i a which ( as then in te rpre ted) denied l i a -
5 
b i l i t y for in ju ry occuring from a known and obvious r i s k . 
Tne r e s u l t of these l i m i t a t i o n s was t h a t an in jured work-
man or, in the case of f a t a l i t y , h i s dependents, could 
r a r e l y •. ' recover damages a t common law even i f they 
were able to ca r ry on an expensive l i t i g a t i o n upto the end. 
i^s the t rade unions began t o wield increas ing powers t o -
wards the end of the l a s t century they became p a r t i c u l a r l y 
concerned at the high accident r a t e in indus t ry , and the 
fac t t ha t the v ic t ims of. . i n d u s t r i a l acc idents were usual ly 
l e f t with nothing except poor c h a r i t a b l e r e l i e f t o l ive on. 
In t ha t s t a t e of the condi t ions , a reac t ion aga ins t the 
doctr ine of l u i s s e z f a i r e i nev i t ao ly se t i n . sensing the 
resentment both cour t s and l e g i s l a t u r e , during the l a s t 
twenty years of the nineteenth century, began the slow task 
of modifying these p r i n c i p l e s . In 1880, Parl iament passed 
Employer's L i a b i l i t y Act which cut down the a v a i l a b i l i t y 
of the doct r ine of caramon employment as a defence to the 
employer in an ordinary ac t ion a t coenmon law, though r e s -
t r i c t i n g the damages recoverable in such a case t o three 
years loss of ea rn ings . The cou r t s responded by curtci i l ing 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the defence of vo len t i non f i t i n ju r i a 
6 
in Smith's case in 1891. Between 1878 when the Factory and 
5. Cron in , J ,B .& Grime, R . P . : Labour Law, P. 253 
6. Smith V. Baker & Co.Ltd . (1891) A.C. 325 
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Workshop Acts were consolidated/ and 1901/ a stream of 
new factory legislation emerged even from a generally 
conservative Parliament not particularly devoted to social 
reform. The Courts also responded here by creating the 
7 
action for breach of statutory duty in Groves• case in 1898. 
But these developments were dwarfed in significance 
by the enactment of the Workmen's Ccxnpensation Act of 1897. 
Act broke away entirely from the basic ccxnmon law principle 
that liability must be based on fault, and conferred on 
workman v or his dependents) a rignt to compensation for 
any accident 'arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment*. Thus the rtCt provides insurance principle of 
covering workmen for all work connected accidents. In 
effect this -iCt treated work;nan as insured against such 
risks/ but unlike German ^ct employers were not compelled 
to insure against their new statutory liability. English 
*ict provided for compulsory payment by tlie employer of sooe 
compensation, calculated by reference to the wages for 
death or disablement of a worker by accident while at his 
work independently of any negligence or breach of duty on 
the part of the employer. ^Ithou^h contributory negligence 
was not wholly excluded by the ^ct. Compensation was denied 
if the accident was due to the workman's 'serious and wilful 
default'. This defence was excluded in cases of serious and 
7. Groves v. Wimborne (1898) 2 w.B, 402 
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Pepnanent. disablement/ and in fatal cases, by the amending 
«.ct of 190 6/ but it was still possible in some circxim-
stances to deny compensation ^or an accident caused by 
the Workman's fault (even though not serious and wilful) 
on the ground that his conduct took him out of the 
•sphere of his employment' so that the resulting accident 
was held not to arise 'out of and in the coxirse of his 
employment•. The rule of common employment was no bar 
to recovery of compensation under the Act, Originally 
Act was limited to injuries caused directly by accidents 
and it covered only a few industries and occupations but 
the list was enlarged by subsequent amendments euid by a 
fresh Act passed in 1906« occupational diseases were added 
to it. The benefit of the Act was/however limited to 
workmen drawing remxineratlon upto a stated amount, although 
the Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted in England to 
make it easier and cheaper for the workmen to obtain at 
least some-compensation, it did not rid his chance of 
getting compensation altogether of uncertainty and diffi-
culty. The National Insurance ^^ ct 1911 introduced health 
and unemployment insurance for certain category of workers 
and marked the start of a national insurance in England. 
In course of time these two pillars of the social secu-
rity system - workmen's compensation and national insurance-
became exceedingly complex. World War II, further aggra-
vated the situation and brought new problems of persistent 
inflation, this nelped to destroy the insurance basis 
of all other national insurance schemes as well as the 
workmen's compensation system. Public opinion moved 
cowards the view that there should be some easier method 
to secure compensation and workmen's right to compensa-
tion for industrial injuries should be placed on a more 
secure basis than under tne Workmen's Compensation ^ c^t. 
Thus by 1942 matters were ripe for the Beveridge Report 
which was published In that year. 
Publication of the Beveridge Report in England 
changed the whole outlook and philosophy for providing 
8 
social security. The result was that the Workmen's Com-
pensation «-vct was replaced in England by the National 
Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946, which came 
in force in 1948. Tnis ^ct introduced an insurance system 
under which insurance benefits were payable to victims of 
industrial accidents and to sufferers from certain indus-
trial diseases. Although the limitation that the accident 
must be one "arising out of and in the course of employ-
ment" remained, the class of accidents satisfying that 
description was greatly enlarged by providing a number of 
statutory presumptions in favour of tne injured workmen 
which were made available to him even in cases where he had 
8, Clarke, R.W.B, "The Beveridge Report and After' 
William A Robsoh/ P. 289 
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disregarded the r e l evan tx regu la t ions or disobeyed h i s 
mas te r ' s o rders , provided ce r t a inao the r condi t ions were 
f u l f i l l e d . The l i m i t a t i o n of workmen's own negligence 
or disobedience was p r a c t i c a l l y abolished by the Act and 
cont r ibu tory negligence by a separate Act. The solatium 
was named ' b e n e f i t ' i n s t ead of compensation and was made 
payable out of a fund t o be b u i l t up with equal con t r ibu-
t i ons by the employers and the employees and surplus by 
the S t a t e . Las t ly , the remedies under the workmen's Com-
pensation Act and a t common law were a l t e r n a t i v e s / those 
under the l ia t ional Insurance ( Indus t r i a l In jur ies ) Act a t 
conmon law were made concurrent both being ava i l ab le to 
the workman, subject to adjustment ot the damages awarded 
9 
under the common law. Unlike the Workrnen's Compensation 
rtCt whicn was acininistered by the ordinary cour t s , the new 
Act was to be administered by the Ministry of National 
Insurance. 
I t w i l l thus be seen t h a t , in England, Workmen's 
coxnpensation has ceased t o be a rr.atter of a decree by the 
cour t aga ins t the employer and has become an insured benef i t 
obtainable from the Sta te out of a spec ia l fund iaaintained 
for the purpose. From a p o s i t i o n lying between t o r t and 
insurance, the b a s i s of the workman's claiai has moved to be 
l i a b i l i t y of tiie Sta te as an Insurer under something l ike a 
pol icy of accident insurance aga ins t , dea th , disablement or 
9. Supra note 2, P. x 
^^) 
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disease caused by an industrial accident. England 
had achieved/though thr©u^ ^ piecemeal legislation, an 
integrated system of social security/ to afford subs-
tantial relief to its citizens* ensuring a fair supple-
ment to the wage-earner and the deprived family when 
income is reduced. 
C-INDIAN POSITION; 
In India joint family system was a sort of forti-
fication against insecurity. The social fabric* reinforced 
by the responsibility of the leaders (patriarchs) of the 
society* or the eldest son in the family under the rule 
of primogeniture* could render some sort of support to 
the members of the family, whose bread-winner had suffered 
occupational hazards or otherwise fallen on evil days, A 
moral responsibility was emphasised* in preference to 
fixation of fault liability to compensate the victim and 
his family for accidental death or deprivation in the 
eastern societies. The break-up of the family system into 
nuclear and urban families* required social assistance in 
place of family support, and volvintary organisation of 
came to play a vital role to provide subsistence to the 
victims of industrial injury as a charitable measure. As 
a result* even industrial employers used to pay compensa-
tion to their workers' who suffer accidental injury* only 
as a matter of charity and solatiim, until the advent of 
compensation laws based on strict liability, analogous to 
that of the British statute. 
)L'i 
1. STATUTORY HISTORY OF rvORKMEJN" ' S COMPEk'SATIQK Ii^i INDIA; 
On account of the British sovereignty over India, 
the legislative power was the prerogative of the Crown 
and legislation in India was more often analogous to 
that of English Statutes. The history of social seciirity 
legislation can be traced to the early part of the 20th 
centxiry. In the native states there were certain social 
benefit schemes introduced by the monarchs/ which were 
based on the theory of monarchical Clemency and philan-
thropy* as a matter of recognition of faithful service 
for which the gratitude of the State was bestowed by cha-
ritable measxires. The benefit group was far too less and 
were primarily the servants of the monarchs. For several 
decades there was no risk coverage or protection to the 
workers against any contingency, India being a member of 
the International Labour Organisation, (ILO), ever since 
its inception in 1919 it was obligatory on the part of 
tne Government of India to engage in law-making regarding 
the conventions it ;iad ratified. Prior to 1923, except 
legislation relating to specific areas such as factories, 
mines and plantations, which incorporated certain welfare 
provisions, there was no protection or relief provided by 
law to the workers employed in the industrial sector in 
general. Tne provisions in tliese enactments sougnt only 
to prevent tne abuses practiced by employers and con-
tractors in the employment of WOmen and children. Tne 
first break-through came/ and the only statute which 
provided for the claim of compensation by the institu-
tion of proceedings in the law courts is the Fatal 
accidents Act* 1855. Tne /^t laid down that if the death 
is caused to a workman by wrongful act, neglect or default, 
the erring party was made liable to pay damage to the 
deceased employee's executors even if the accident was 
contributed by the circumstances, v^ich amount to felony 
or other crime. However, the Fatal Accidents ^ct did not 
prove satisfactory. Some demands were made for compensa-
tion by the workers in 1884 and in 1885 and again in 1910, 
yet before 1923, when the Workmen's Compensation Mct was 
passed it was impossible for an injured workman to recover 
damage.'or compensation for any injury sustained by him in 
the ordinary course of his employment, except on rare occa-
sions when the employer was liable at common law for his 
own personal negligence. In 1922, a section was inserted 
11 
in the Factories Act, giving power to a criminal court 
to order a payment of fine imposed for infliction of injury 
12 
to the injured person or his dependents. 
All these measures proved inadequate and unsatisfac-
tory in a changing industrial enviornment. The complexity 
of industrial occupations and the increasing use of 'machi-
nery for production exposing the workman to unavoidable 
11, The Factories Act, 1911 
12, Saxena,R.C,:Labour Problems & Social Welfare,?.390(1981) 
t 
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risks and the comparative poverty of workmen made the 
government think of giving adequate statutory protec-
tion to workmen, 
2. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT OF 1923: 
The Industrial Revolution brought in its train 
the multitude of the maimed, the halt and the blind. 
There was a rapid increase in diseases* deaths and in-
juries among industrial workers due to accidents. Against 
the soaring profits and the whirr, vrtiirr of wheels* the 
dread shapes of betrayed* plundered, profaned and dis-
inherited humanity cried for redress. The loss of human 
material lay where it fell on the workers themselves or 
their families. The voiceo of dolorous pitch did not 
reach the rich. The intoxication of swelling profits 
inhibited for a long time tne capitalist economy, in the 
matter of workmen's health and safety. The law sided 
with the prosperous employers in the becoming factories 
against the destitution of disabled workmen or their 
defendants thrown upon society as mere objects of charity. 
Such social indifference could not last long. Such law 
could not last long. Liberal ideas and organised labour 
exerted pressure. Further, the commercial prosperity of 
a colonial empire gradually became conscious of the hens 
at home laying the golden eggs. 
13. Supra note, 2 Chap, I, P.l 
In 1921 Government r e a l i s e d t h a t though the 
general p r i n c i p l e s of v;orkmen's ca-npensation commanded 
xiniversal acceptance, India was alone a.mong c i v i l i z e d 
coun t r i e s which did not have l e g i s l a t i o n embodying these 
p r i n c i p l e s and therefore a proposal for .workmen's Com-
pensation rtct was made in the same year. Public opinion 
on the subject was i nv i t ed . A committee, composed of 
members of the l e g i s l a t i v e assen±>ly, employer's and 
worker 's r ep resen td t ives and medical and insurance ex-
14 
perts/ was cons t i t u t ed which met in 1922. The Committees 
detai led recommendations for framing l eg i s la t ion were 
accepted with some miner variations by the majority of 
the local governments and by the association of emplo-
15 
yers and workers. 
3~0BJECTS AND REASONS; 
The necessity for the passing of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act had been explained as follows in the 
statement of objects and reasons annexed to the then 
Bill which became the Act VIII of 1923 -
"The growing complexity of industry 
in- this country, with the Increasing 
use of machinery and consequent 
danger to workmen, along with the com-
parative poverty of the workmen them-
selves render it advisable that they 
should be protected, as far as possible f 
from hardship arising from accidents. 
14. Kothari,G.i-;. irt. study of Industrial Law,PP. 499-50 4 
15. Report of the Joint Committee, See Gazette of India, 
1923, Ft, V. P.37 
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An additional advantage of legis-
lation of this type is that, by 
increasing the importance for the 
employer of adequate safety devices, 
it reduces the number of accidents 
to workmen in a manner that can not 
be achieved by official inspection. 
Further/ the encouragement given to 
employers to provide adequate medical 
treatment for their workmen should 
mitigate the effects of such accidents 
as do occur. The benefits so conferred 
on the workman added to the increased 
sense of security whicn he will enjoy, 
snould render industrial life more 
attractive and thus increase the avai-
lable supply of labour, ^t txie same 
time, a corresponding increase in the 
efficiency of the average workman may 
be expected", 16 
Realising the importance the bill was introduced in the 
Legislative Assembly in September, 1922 which was passed 
as Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, and was put into 
force on 1st July, 1924. 
It was first statute passed under the social secu-
rity measures in India, The Workmen's Compensation Act, 
1923, provides for compensation in accordance with the 
universal principle that compensation should be given to 
workmen who sustained personal injuries by accidents 
17 
"arising out of and in the course of employment". 
Compensation will also be given in certain limited circxim-
stances for disease. The«ct granted the right of statutory 
compensation to the workmen, and the employer was not 
16. Statement of Objects & Reasons, Gazette of India,1922 
Pt. V. P. 313 
17. Section 3 
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absolved of the statutory liability except under 
specific circumstances. The quantvun of payment is 
proportionately related to the wages received, and 
limited to a maximum. The workmen's compensation 
Commissioner determined the claim and adjudicated upon 
disputes arising out of the claims, sxJoject to the 
control of the civil courts. 
4- SCOPE AND APPLICATION t 
The scope and application of the Act, though ori-
ginaly limited, has been extended from time to time by 
various amendments. The Act was amended in 1926 and 1929 
to remedy certain admitted defects and improvements in 
the /ict and to ratify the International Labour Convention 
on occupational diseases. To modify the principles under-
lying the ^ct and its important features. Royal Commis-
sion on Labour examined thejeprovisions of the Act in 
great detail and made a number of recommendations, ^s a 
result of these recommendations a consolidating and amend-
ing Act was passed in the year 1933. By the amendment of 
1937 the provision for the transfer of distribution pr©-
ceedings v/as ..lade possible. «gain tne i-i.ct was amended 
in 1938 to remove certain ambiguities and minor defects 
in the administration of the ^ct. There were two special 
measures to cover war tii:;e injuries during the war. Con-
sequently the Workman's Cc^ipensation ^ct v;as amended in 
•:\U 
1939 and then i n 1942 t o p r e v e n t the p o s s i b i l i t y o^ 
double c l a im fo r the same i n j u r i e s under t h e two r ^ t s . 
The .vorkmen' s Compensation .rLCt was a l s o extendeddand 
enforced by t n e Ind ian Independence Order of 1948 
("do^^tatioa C o n t r o l ^ c t s and Ordinances) and by the «dop-
t a t i o n o i Law o r d e r of 1958. The amendments to the Work-
men's Compensation Act i n 1946 and in 1959 were the most 
important ones . While 1946 amendment r a i s e d the wage 
l i m i t s of the workers covered by the Act, from Rs. 3 0 0 / -
to Rs. 4 0 0 / - . By 1962 amendment i t was r a i s e d to Rs. 500 / -
and to Rs, 1 / 0 0 0 / - again by .1976 amendment. The amendment 
of 1959, removed the d i s t i n c t i o n between an adul t and a 
18 
minor for the purpose of the a c t . Waiting period of 
7 days was reduced to 3 days as prescr ibed by the ILO 
Convention, Employer's L i a b i l i t y ^ct of 1938/ was amended 
in 1951 to remove the a p p l i c a t i o n of the d o c t r i n e s of 
"Common employment" and "assumed r isk", waich were taken 
as a defence in payment of s ta tu tory compensation. 
The Workmen's Compensation n e t was amended again in 
1984. By t h i s amendment the coverage of workmen and the 
wage l i m i t has been removed. At present Schedule I I con-
t a i n s 32 employments the persons working vrtierein are work-
men within the meaning of the Act. As for wage l i m i t i s 
18. Saxena/ R.C. s Labour Problems & S o c i a l Welfare/PP. 
390-391/ (1981) 
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concerned it has been laid down that if the workmen 
covered is getting the wages exceeding Rs. 1,000/- per 
month for the pxirpose of calculation of the amount of 
compensation it shall be deemed that he is getting 
Rs. 1,000/- only and exceeding amount shall not be-taken 
into account. In short the ;scope auid application of the 
Act was amended! 
(a) to include more industrial establishment 
to which the Act applies; 
(b) to provide compensation to a greater number 
of workmen; 
(c) to cover more injuries and diseases as com-
pensable harm within the scope of the Act;d( 
(d) to reduce the waiting period so that work-
men suffering from disabilities for less 
than seven days may also get compensation. 
Save for widening tne scope of the ^^ ct an aforesaid 
matters the fundamental basis of the Act remains unchanged. 
On the whole the trend of amendments shows a gra-
dual increase in theeemployer's liabixity. Inspite or 
this trend and the smooth working of the ^ct, as praised 
19 
by the iloyal Commission on JLabour, Prof. B.D. Adarkar 
remarked that the Workmen's Compensation -^t "has ad-;iit-
tedly become out of date in its scope and operation" and 
that "the administration and operation of the ^^t ha.ve 
been a comparative failure". As a result ox h,y.adarkar's 
19. Report of the Royal Cornmission on Labour in India,?. 296 
20. B.p. Adarkar's,Report on Health Insurance for (lv31; 
Industrial .iorkers, FP. 213-14, (1944) 
3^ ' 
report the Parliament passed the Employes State Insu-
rance x^t, 1948, which without repealing the Workmen's 
Compensation Act provides; 
When a person is entitled to any of the 
benefits provided by this Act/ he shall 
not be entitled to receive any similar 
benefit admissible under the provisions 
of any other enactments.21 
The new .-u:t provides for a benefit similar to workmen's 
compensation which is known as disablement benefit and 
is available to workmen insured under the Act and suffe-
ring from .disablement as a result of employment injury. 
As the Employees State Insurance Act is of a limited 
application the study of Workmen's Compensation Act 
still has its importance. 
21 
ion 61 of Tne Employee's S t a t e Insurance Act, 
1948 
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EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY TO PAY COMPENSATION 
Workmen's Compensat ion A c t , 1923 makes p r o v i s i o n s 
f o r payment o f c o m p e n s a t i o n t e c h n i c a l l y known a s workmen's 
compensat ion i n t n e e v e n t of a p e r s o n a l i n j u r y c a u s e d t o a 
workman by a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g o u t of and i n the c o u r s e of h i s 
employment. 
The q u e s t i o n t o be d e a l t w i t h h e r e i s a s t o what 
are c o n d i t i o n s under which the employer i s l i a b l e t o pay 
compensat ion or what a r e c o n d i t i o n s under which a workman 
i s e n t i t l e d t o c o m p e n s a t i o n and what are d e f e n c e s i f any 
which may be taken i n order t o a v o i d the l i a b i l i t y t o pay 
compensat ion by t h e employer , 
A. LAW RELATING TO EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY: 
The I n d i a n law o f e m p l o y e r ' s l i a b i l i t y more or l e s s 
c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e E n g l i s h law of e m p l o y e r ' s l i a b i l i t y which 
ran a s f o l l o w s : 
B. -ENGLISH LAW; 
The l i a b i l i t y o f t h e employer t o p a y compensat ion t o 
t h e workmen under t h e r e p e a l e d E n g l i s h Workmen's Compensation 
1 
A c t , 1 9 2 5 , i s a s f o l l o w s : 
1 . S e c t i o n I 
34 
11) If in any employment personal injxiry by accident 
a r i s i n g out of and in the course of the employment i s 
caused t o a workman, h i s employer s h a l l , subject as he re -
i n a f t e r mentioned be l i a b l e t o pay compensation in accor-
dance with the p rov i s ions he re ina f t e r contained. 
provided t h a t s-
(a) The employer s h a l l not be l i a b l e xinder t h i s Act in 
r e spec t of ciny in ju ry which does not d i sab le the 
workman for a per iod of a t l e a s t th ree days from 
earning f u l l wages a t the work a t which he was 
employed/ 
(b) I f i t i s proved t h a t the injxiry t o a workman i s 
a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the se r ious and wilful misconduct 
of t h a t workman any compensation claimed in respec t 
of t h a t injxary s h a l l , vinless the injxiry r e s u l t s in 
death or se r ious and permanent disablement, be 
disal lowed. 
(2) For the purpose of t h i s Act, an accident r e s u l t i n g 
in the death or se r ious and permanent disablement of a work-
man s h a l l be deemed t o a r i s e out of and in the course of h i s 
employment, not-withs tanding t h a t the workman was a t the time 
when the accident happened act ing in contravent ion of any 
s t a t u t o r y or other r egu la t ion appl icab le to h i s employment, 
or any of orders given by or on behalf of h i s employer, or 
3f. 
t h a t he was ac t ing without i n s t r u c t i o n s from h i s employer, 
i f such ac t was done by the workman for the purpose of 
and in connection with h i s employer 's t r ade or bus iness . 
C - IMDIAN LAW: 
The Indian workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides 
for the liability of the employer to pay compensation in 
2 
following manners 
(1) If personal injury is caused to a workman by 
accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, 
his employer shall be liable to pay ccMnpensation in accordance 
witn trie provisions of the Chapter. 
Provided tnat the employer shall not be so liable -
(a) in respect of any injury which does not result 
in the total or partial disablement of the workman 
for a period exceeding (three) days; 
(b) in respect of any injury not resulting in death, 
caused by an accident which is directly attribuable 
to -
(i) the workman having been at the time there 
under the influence of drinks or drugs, or 
2. Section 3 
3h 
be liable to pay compensation to the workman. 
Those are as follows: 
(a) Where the injxiry did not result in total or 
partial disablement for a period exceeding 
three days; and 
(b) In respect of any injury not resulting 
in death the employer can plead; 
(i) that the accident occurred under the 
influence of drinks or drugs; 
(ii) that the workman wilfully disobeyed an 
order expressly given or rule expressly framed 
to secure his safety; 
(iii) that the workman knowingly and wilfully 
disregarded or removed the certain safety guards 
or safety devices provided to secure his safety. 
To give compensation for very trivial injuries would 
result in malingering and therefore a waiting period of 
3 days has been fixed by the Act. Therefore in cases of 
injuries which does not result in partial or total dis-
ablement for a period exceeding three days, the employer 
will not be liable. 
proviso (b) of Section 3(1) applies only v^en injury has 
not resulted in death. Thus when accident occurs under 
the influence of drinks or drugs the employer will not be 
liable. But vrtiere some time has elapsed between the acci-
dent and the workman's medical examination, the doctor's 
3 : 
(ii) the wilful disobedience of the workman to an 
order expressly given/ or to a rule expressly framed, 
for the pxirpose of secxiring the safety of workman, or 
(iii) the wilful removal or disregard by the workman 
of any safety guard or other device which he knew to 
have been provided for the purpose of securing the 
safety of workman. 
Now as far as sub-section(l) of Section 3 is concerned^ the 
workman or his dependent can claim compensation xinder the 
following sets of conditions: 
that the injury; 
(a) was personal; 
(b) arose from an accident; 
(c) arose out of the employment; 
(d) arose in the course of employment; 
(e) resulted in partial or total disablement for a 
period of not less than three days; or 
(f) must have resulted in death of the workman. 
Hon fullfilment of any of the above conditions will greatly 
damage the claim for compensation. These conditions will be 
discussed in detail latter on because they necessarily needs 
elaboration. 
However provisos to sub-section (1) of section 3 spe-
cifies certain situations under which an employer will not be 
3.S 
evidence that he was drunk at the time of accident is 
inadmissible as merely hearsay and can not be admitted 
3 
even as part of res gestae. 
Secondly, proviso (b) (ii), gives the defence to employer 
to plead that the workman wilfully disobeyed an order 
expressly given and therefore he is not liable for compen-
sation. But it does not mean that if the workman had dis-
obeyed a rule referred in priviso, the accident could not 
have arisen out of and in the course of the employment by 
that reason alone. Even on assumption that there was wilful 
disobedience of regulations, the compensation Commissioner 
may find whether the act of wilful disobedience was the 
immediate or direct cause of the accident or not. In 
4 
Pure Dhansar Coal Co. case where the accident occurred 
because of ropes fastening the trolley were weak and not 
because the workman got upon the trolley and there was no 
pcoor. that the workman had knowledge of regulation; it was 
held thattthe workman was entitled to compensation. 
Mere negligence is not wilful disobedience. Mere dis-
obedience is not enough. It may be result of forgetfulness 
5 
or of the impulse of the moment. For the application of 
this proviso the following conditions must be fulfilled: 
3. Shambhu v. Jagdish, AIR 1961, All, 89 
4. Pure Dhansar Coal Co. v, Debendranath, 1968 (16) FLR 338 
5. Bhutnath Dal Mills v. Tirat Mistry, AIR, 1949 Cal. 295 
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(i) an order or rule must have been given or 
framed to secure safety of workman. Only 
warning is not enough; 
(ii) order or rule must be expressly given or 
framed for such purpose; 
(iii) its terms must have been brought to the notice 
of the individual workman. And an illiterate 
workman should be warned by supervisor. 
(iv) disobedience/ must be wilful, not merely neg-
ligent; 
cv ) the accident must have been directly attribu-
table to the disobedience. 
If the practice has been to ignore the pronibition 
and the practice has been permitted, connived or winked 
at ty employer or his responsible officers, then the emp-
6 
loy^r would be liable. The test is not the doing of an 
a c t for the pxirpose and with the specific intent of vio-
lating a rule but the wilful and conscious doing ot the 
act which i s in violat ion of the reasonable rule known to 
7 
the actor. 
Sub-section(2) of section 3 of the Act provides for 
compensation caused by occupational disease. The Act 
equates personal injury by accident with that of specified 
6, Me11or V. Ashton,14 B.W.C.C. 128 
7. 71 Corpus Jxoris/ P. 767 
•tn 
"occupational d i sease" for the purpose of l i a b i l i t y 
of the employer to pay compensation. 
This provision w i l l be discussed under separate heading. 
Sub-section (2-A) of sect ion 3 au thor i ses the 
conuuissioner to apport ion the compensation payable as 
between the employers regarding employment speci f ied in 
8 
p a r t *C* of Schedule I I I where such employment was under 
more than one employer. 
Sxib-section (3) au thor i ses the S ta te Government in 
r e spec t of pa r t *\ and B and Central Government in r e spec t 
of Par t C of the Schedule I I I to add any descr ip t ion of 
employment and d i seases in respect ive p a r t of the schedule. 
But before doing so the respec t ive Governments should 
no t i fy in Off ic ia l Gazet te , th ree months before* i t s i n -
t en t ion to do so. 
Sxib-section (4) of sec t ion 3 makes a d i s t i n c t i o n 
between occupational d i seases covered by Section 3 C2)/ 
(2)-A) and (3) and o the r d i seases . In respec t of occupa-
t i o n a l d iseases i t i s pos tu l a t ed t h a t the con t rac t ing of 
such disease s h a l l be an in ju ry by acc ident . But the 
p rov i s ions about occupat ional d i seases do not cover a l l 
such cases . Section 3(4) provides t h a t in r e spec t of 
o ther d iseases / no compensation would be payable un less 
the disease has a r i s en out of and in the course of em-
ployment. Some nexus must be e s t ab l i shed between the 
9 
d isease and spec i f ic in ju ry by acc ident . i t must be 
8. The workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 
9. Kalljjc' , J .N: Law of workmen's Compensation in India , 
— 1 ^ 1 
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shown t h a t the work in some way cont r ibu ted t o or acce-
l e r a t ed the process of disablement or death . A workman 
suffer ing from a p r e - e x i s t i n g d isease a f f ec t i ng a v i t a l 
organ while on duty, i s covered by the Act, i f the nature 
of the d u t i e s are l i k e l y t o cause s t r a i n t o him and acce-
10 
l e ra ted h i s dea th . 
Sub-section (5) of Section 3 of the Act provides 
t h a t i f a s u i t has been i n s t i t u t e d by an employee in a 
c i v i l cour t , no r i g h t of compensation would be conferred 
by the a c t on him and i f there i s claim before the commis-
sioner or an agreement with the employer xinder the ^c t , no 
s u i t for damages would be mainta inable . Under sect ion 19(2) 
of the /ict the C i v i l Court would have no J u r i s d i c t i o n to 
s e t t l e or deal with any quest ion which i s by or under t h i s 
rict required to be s e t t l e d , decided or d e a l t with by a Com-
missioner or to enforce any l i a b i l i t y incur red under t h i s 
Act. This i s in s t r i c t conformity with the p r i n c i p l e of 
the common law t h a t when a person has been once compensated 
for an i n ju ry he i s not e n t i t l e d to pursue any c o l l a t e r a l 
remedy aga ins t the same person in r e spec t of the same in jury . 
Thus the Workmen's Compensation Act e n t i t l e s an 
employee ( with c e r t a i n except ions ) who i s in jured by an 
accident a r i s i n g out of and in the course of employment 
10. Shantaban v. New Raipur Mi l l s Co. Ltd.,AIR 1968 GuJ.113 
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and disabled for a period exceeding three days, to recover 
canpensation. The employer's contributory negligence is 
no defence to the employer iinless it amounts to serious 
and wilful misconduct and not even then if the injury is 
permanent or fatal. It is also not necessary that the 
accident should have been caused by some wrongful act of 
employer. 
D - PERSONAL INJURY BY ACCIDENTi 
The employer's liability to pay compensation arises 
only "If personal injury is caused to a workman by accident". 
So in order to fix liability over here two things must be 
present: 
1- the workman must have sustained personal 
injury; and 
2- the personal injury must hdVc been caused by 
an accident. 
1. PERSONAL INJURY; 
The personal injury raeans# ^ ay injury caused to the 
person of a workman affecting his efficiency of labour or 
reducing his earning capacity in any employment in which 
he was engaged at±the time of accident or in every employment 
which he was capable of undertaking at that time. Injury 
caused to his personality which may affect his earning capa-
city is personal injury and it does not only mean physical 
43 
injury, personality does not only mean physical appearance 
or bodily appearance but personality means the sum total 
of traits of his behaviour including mental or psychological 
11 
traits. An injury which reduces his capacity to earn is 
lla 
personal injury whether it is physical or otherwise. A 
workman becomes entitled tozcorapensation if personal injiiry 
is caused to him by an accident arising out of and in the 
course of employment provided he is disabled for a period 
exceeding three days. 
The expression 'personal injury* has not been defined 
in Indian workmen's Compensation Act, nor it has been defined 
in its corresponding English /tct. 
The word 'injury' originally, has reference to a 
physiological injury. It is a word of wide import. In the 
concise Oxford Dictionary the meaning of the word is given 
as "wrongful action or treatment, harm, damage". Personal 
injury does not only mean physical or bodily injury but 
includes even a nervous shock, mental injury or strain which 
causes a chill or abnormal mental conditions. It is a term 
wider than bodily injury. 
The Judges, however, had on many occasions tried to 
determine the exact connotation of the word as used in.the 
Act. 
11. Goswami, V. G : Labour and Industrial Laws, P. 383 
lla. Krishnan,P.G.:Social ^curity. Workmen's Compensation, 
.vIII,C.U.L.R. , June, 1989 
^t't 
In The Indian News Chronicle Ltd. / Lazarus was 
employed as an e l e c t r i c i a n in the p r e s s and in the 
course of h i s d u t i e s he had t o go f requent ly i n t o a 
heating-room and from the re to a cool ing p l a n t where 
the temperature was kept considerably low. One day he 
went i n t o the cooling room and on the same n igh t he suddenly 
f e l l i l l by the a t t a c k of pneumonia and died a f t e r a 
shor t i l l n e s s of f ive days. Compensation was demanded .i^y 
h i s h e i r s . The defendant ' s conten t ions were f i r s t l y no 
personal in ju ry was caused to the workman, and secondly, 
i t was not caused by an accident a r i s i n g out of and in 
the course of h i s employment. 
While negat iv ing the content ions Kapur J . l a i d 
down t h a t heat exhausta t ion may c o n s t i t u t e the type of 
bod i ly in jury t h a t i s contemplated by the word ' i n j u r y ' . 
Death from sunstroke has been held to be compensable as a 
v io l en t in jury produced by an ex t e rna l power vdiich i s 
not n a t u r a l . In the p resen t case . . . no evidence has 
been produced on behalf of the defendant to show t h a t i t 
was an id iopa tn lc d i s ea se . There are a la rge nxiraber of 
/iraerican cases on t h i s po in t . In 71 corpus. J u r i s , 
paragraph 335, P. 585, i t has been sa id t h a t i f the f a c t s 
12, Indian News Chronicle Ltd. v. Luis Lazarus,AIR 1951 
Punj. 102 
4;i 
show a casual connection between the injury and the 
development of the disease, the victim of the disease 
is entitled to compensation. 
The Court held the employer liable to pay com-
pensation as the injury was a personal injury arising 
out of and in the course of his employment. 
13 
In Burn, the Court said : "In common speech the 
word 'injury* as applied to a personal injury to a human 
being includes whatever Lesion or change in any part of 
the system produces harm or pain or a lessened facility 
of the Jiataral use of any bodily activity or capability". 
Traumatic injuries, such as broken bones and exter-
nal physical injuries definitely comes \inder the definiticai 
of personal injuries* Any blow or trauma to the human 
flesh is a personal injury. If any artificial part (made 
of wood etc.) of human body is broken by accident then 
such damage will be solely property damage, not personal 
injury. An artificial part is a man's property, not part 
of his person, and no compensation can be awarded for its 
inj xiry. 
Nervous collapse without physical impart is a com-
pensable "personal injury". Traxiraatic neurosis following 
physical injuries are almost universally compensated, even 
13, Chillu Kahar v. Burn & Co,,AIR 1953, Cal, 516 
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though financial/ marital and other worries play a 
part. SO/ too^ are many injuries to nerves even by 
invisible but poisonous coal-tar gas, hysterical blind-
ness following injury/ leg injury led to neurosis* not 
malingere/ permanent partial incapacity/ traxanatic 
neurosis or neurasthenia to±iowing burial by rock, ava-
lanche/ post-trauma tic/ hysteria neurosis is compensable 
as a "disease" resulting from an "injury"/ injury to 
optic nerve. 
A person suffering from heart disease died viille 
on duty because of the strain caused upon his heart by 
the work assigned to him. It was heid tnat the workman 
died out of the injury caused in the course of his empxoy-
14 
ment. 
Self-inflacted injur ies cannot be said to have 
been caused by an accident. The mishap or accident must 
be looked a t from the workman's point of view. I t means 
personal injury not by design but by accident. The 
expression used in the section i s personal injury by 
15 
accident and not personal injury by an accident, 
2. ACCIDENT; 
The second essential requirement for making a 
workman entitled to compensation is that the personal 
injury must have been caused by an "accident". 
14. Laxmi Baj v. Chairman & Trustee Bcxnbay Port Trust/ 
AIR 1954 Bom. 180 
15. Glasgow Coal Co.Ltd. v. welsh,1950 SC 10 20. 
The term "accident** has not been defined 
in the Act, nor is the word defined in the Employee's 
State Insurance Act, The word has not also been 
defined in the English Act, but Judges have from tiwe 
to time attempted to define the terra. 'Macgillivery, 
observes: 
"In British Accident Policies,'accident* 
uaually means bodily injury caused by accidental, ex-
16 
ternal and invisible means". 
In Halsbury's Laws of England, it is stated: 
"The term 'accident' means some unexpected 
event happening without design, but perhaps no general 
definition can be given of the word to cover all cases 
falling within the Act, To decide vrtiether an occurence 
is an accident, it must be regarded from the point of 
view of the workman who suffers from it, and if it is 
xinexpected and without design on his part It may be 
accidental though intentionally caused by the author 
of it, or caused by some act committed wilfully by him". 
17 
In Trim Joint District School case, a school -master 
at an industrial school was deliberately assaulted by 
some of the pupils and died as a result, it was held 
16. Macgillivery on Insvirance Law, P, 944 
17, Trim Joint District School Board of Management v. 
Kelly, 1914 ^ .C. 667 
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by the House of Lords by a majority of one that his 
dependents were entitled to compensation, the death 
being nonethless accidental because it was caused by the 
criminal act of a third party. The law as thus finally 
settled is in accordance with the previous decisions in 
18 
itisbet where the cashier was shot by robber while 
carrying money by train, it was held that the murder was 
death by accident. 
Accident generally means some unexpected event 
happening without design, even if it bo found that there 
was negligence on the paxt of the workman concerned. If 
the work in which the workman is engaged is within his 
employment, the question of negligence, great or small,is 
irrelevant. If the workman is doing an act within the 
scope of his action, no amount of negligence on his part 
can change his action into a non-employment job, so as to 
19 
exempt the employer from liability to pay compensation. 
20 
In padam Debi an accident is caused to a motorb 
bus in that it dashed against a tree as a result of its 
being driven by the driver rashly and negligently resulting 
in injuries to the driver leading to his death, it must 
be held that his death is caused by an accident and the 
employer would be liable to pay compensation under section 
3(1) of the /vct. The fact that the driver was negligent or 
that he committed a breach of the provisions of the Motor 
18. Nlsbet V. Rayne & Burn,(ISig)2 K.B.689 
19. Goswami, V.G, Labour & Industrial Laws,P. 384 
20. Padam Debi v. Raghunath Ray,AIR 1950,Orissa,20 7 
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Vehicles Act or the rules there under while driving 
the bus/ are not factors which would effect the rights 
to claim compensation. Once it is proved that the 
accident was caused in the course of his employment, 
the question of negligence, great or small is irrelevant, 
21 
The Gujrat Hign Court in Bai Shakri has defined 
the term accident as follows: 
"The word 'accident' generally means some un-
expected event happening without design even though 
there may be negligence on the part of the workman. It 
is used in the popular and ordinary sense and means a 
mishap or an untoward event not expected or designed, 
what the Act really intends to convey is what might be 
expressed as an accidental injury. It includes not 
only such occurrences such as collisions, tripping over 
floor obstacles, falling of roofs, but also less obvious 
ones causing injury, e.g. strain which causes rupture 
exposure to a draught causing chill,exertion in a stock-
hold causing appoplexy, and shock causing neurasthenia". 
The Assam High Court in rissam Rly. & Trading Co. 
22 
Ltd,case obserbed that "the 'accident* in its popular 
meaning denotes or includes unexpected personal injury 
resulting to the workman in the course of his employment 
from any xinlooked for mishap or occvirrence", 
21. Bai Shakri v. The New Maneck Chowk Mills Co.Ltd.,AIR, IS 
22. Assam Rly. Trading Co, Ltd. v. Saxaswati, AIR 1963 '^ J^ •-^  
'issam , 127 
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Now, it is clear that the 'accident* means a 
mishap or an untoward event not expected or designed. 
The common factor in an accident is some concrete hap-
pening at a definite point of time and the incapacity 
resulting from the happening. 
23 
In Satiya where murder of a Caukidar of an office 
during the course of a bxirglary in the office was held 
an accident from the point of view of the chaukidar as 
it was a mishap or untoward event which was not expected 
or designed and the chaukidar is entitled to compensation 
under the Act. 
24 
In p r a t a p Nara in Singh Deo c a s e where a C a r p e n t e r 
was employed fo r doing some ornamenta l work i n a cinema 
h a l l , fe l l -down and s u f f e r e d i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g i n t h e 
p e r s o n a l injxiry t o t h e workman ou t of and i n t h e c o u r s e 
of h i s employment and t h e d i s ab l emen t be ing t o t a l , i t was 
obse rved by t h e c o u r t t h a t Sec t i on 3 of t h e Act d e a l s 
with t h e e m p l o y e r ' s l i a b i l i t y for compensat ion and sub-
s e c t i o n (1) of t h e s a i d s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s t h a t employer 
s h a l l be l i a b l e t o pay compensat ion i f p e r s o n a l i n j x i r y . i s 
caused t o a workman by a c c i d e n t a r i s i n g ou t of and i n the 
cou r se of employment. Accord ing ly employer became l i a b l e 
t o pay the compensat ion because of p e r s o n a l i n j u r y which was 
2 3 . S a t i y a v. S u b - d i v i s i o n a l Of f i c e r , P . W.D., 1974 LScIC 1516 
24. P r a t a p Nara in Singh Deo v . Sh r i Niwas Sabata u Others , 
AIR 1976, SC 222 
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caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly 
arose out of and in the coxirse of the employment. 
25 
In Jayaram Motor Service case , it was held tnat 
if a workman died even after leaving the work as a 
result of stress and strain which he suffered earlier 
dxiring the period of work/ a connection is established 
between the employment and his death. In this case the 
workraaua died in an unexpected manner and the same could 
not have been foreseen by any body. Hence it will have 
to be accepted that he met with his death as a result of 
an accident. Though the death occured X^^ hours after the 
employee ceased to do his work, it can only be said that 
the stress and the strain sustained by him during the 
course of his work had contributed to his death. 
26 
In Supdt. Engineer/ Prambikulam Aliar Project 
where one Arul Swaml was employed as aluskar to regulate 
the flow of water in the Branch canal operating upon the 
slxiices and shutters under the directions of the Junior 
Engineer incharge of the canal. One day when he was on 
duty some people assaulted and he consequently died. The 
Commissioner awarded a sum of rupees .18,000 to the wife 
of the aluskar as .compensation. The employer contended 
25. Jayaram Motor Service v. Pitchanunal, (1982) II LL.J.149 
26, Su£td7 SngineerT'Par'aiBbikulam "Ali"ar Project/Pollachi '"'^^^^ 
V. Andummal, (l983) II LL.J. 326 (Mad). 
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tftat the death has not arisen out of employment. It 
was held by the Madras High Court that the deceased 
had to be in the place where he was done to death in 
the course of his employment for discharging his duties. 
By reason of his being in that particular place, he had 
to face the indignant agriculturists who had unathorisedly 
diverted the water from the canal and about whom he "had 
made complaint to the junior engineer and by reason of 
tnat, the deceased had to face a peril and the accident 
resulting in nia death was caused by reason of such 
peril which the deceased was obliged to face. In other 
words the accident had taken place out of a peril which 
was very closely and intimately linked up with the per-
formance of the duties of the deceased thereby resulting 
in death by accident. 
27 
In United India Insurance Co, vrtiere the workman, 
a bus conductor died of heart attack while sleeping in 
the vehicle, after a strenuous schedule. The bus crew 
had to sleep in the vehicle at the halting place where 
no shelter was provided for the crew. The employer and 
the insurance company denied liability on the ground 
that the death was not in the course of employment as 
the conductor was not permitted or authorised to sleep 
27. United India Insurance Co. v. C.S.Gopal Krlshnan 
(1989) n LL. J. 30 (Kerala) . 
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in the bus and death was due to natural cause. It 
was held that though there should be casual connection 
between the employment and the death in the unexpected 
way, in order to bring the accident within section 3, 
it is not necessary tnat it should be established that 
the workman diea as a result of exceptional strain 
or some exceptional work that he did on the day in 
question. If the nature of the work and hours of work 
caused great strain to the employee and that strain 
caused the unexpected death/ it can be said that the 
workman died as a result of accident which has arisen 
in the course of his employment. 
It may be concluded that in order to give rise 
to a claim for compensation^ personal injury must 
have been caused by accident arising out of and in 
tne course of employment, ^^ccident as pointed out 
above is an untoward event which is unexpected or un-
designed or a mishap unlooked for, personal injury 
must have been sustained by the workman due to an 
accident for making an employer liable for compensatioo. 
3. EMPIXJYER'S LIABILITY IN CASES OF CX:CUPATIONAL DISEASES: 
Certain occupations involves clear risks from 
diseases peculiar to that employment. If the workers in 
b^t 
these occupations contract particular disease, it .is 
practically certain that the disease arose out of the 
employment. But most industrial diseases are contracted 
gradually, and in the case of a workman who has pursued 
the same occupation xinder the several employers, it is 
not always possible to assign responsibility to any par-
28 
ticular employer. Section 3(2) accordingly provides that 
where a workman contracts any one of the diseases specified 
in Schedule III as an occupational or industrial disease, 
it is for the employer to prove that the disease did not 
result from the employment, 
4, NECESSITY FOR INCLUSION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES 
UNDER THE ACT; 
29 
Brintons case furnishes us the clue to the inclusion 
of diseases within the ambit of the Act. It has been said 
that 'with the development of industrial organisation, the 
situation in which victims of occupational diseases found 
themselves began to claim the attention of public opinion, 
which demanded a solution based on a conciliation and fair 
treatment rather than on the abstract legal interpretation 
of definitions. It was no longer possible for industries to 
remain indifferent to, or ignorant of, the danger inherent 
in its machinery, in the nature of the business, or its 
28. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 
29. Brintons Limited v. Turvey, 1905 A.C. 230 
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complex organisation, apart from any consideration of 
negligence on the part of the employer or the employees. 
Once legislative provisions had been made for 
compensation for accidents^ the question immediately 
arose 2 if compensation can be accorded for a sudden,un-
expected and violent injxiry, why not then give compensa-
tion also for slowly acquired injxiry inseparably connected 
with working materials or even working conditions? 
Before the application of these provisions to 
occupational diseases the position of the injured worker 
caused by occupational diseases was hopeless, even in 
serious cases. The employer, fully aware of the risk 
involved in his establishment, did not take the trouble 
to take the most elementary precautions and failed to 
follow those provided by existing regulations, with the 
result that the worker was constantly in imminent danger 
even! where he himself took the most minute precautions 
to protect himself. 
It was further argued that the carelessness of 
the worker or his lack of personal hygiene constituted 
a factor liable to favour the outbreak of disease or 
aggravate the risk of poisoning. But how many doctors 
have not known patients who were the victims of occupa-
tional disease and who were neverthless careful and 
5r, 
cleanly in their habits? In the absence of all 
measures tending to diminish or eliminate occupa-
tional risk especially where it is known, it is not 
to the victim that negligence and responsibility 
should be imputed. How is he able , for instance, 
to pick out from among the thousands of hides of uni-
form appearance which he handles the one in v^ich danger 
lurks in the shape of an anthrax spore? How may he 
protect himself against noxious fximes, very often 
colourless and odourless which escape undetected from 
the plant or piping because of defective exhaust 
apparatus? 
protection of health is a fundamental duty of the 
State. Injuries due to occupational disease are of 
more serious import than injury by accident, both from 
the aspect of the individual and of society. It brings 
about serious and deep-seated destruction of health 
and often exerts an effect on progeny and the race. 
An occupational disease is the consequence of ordinary 
work of the repeated influence of a mechanical, physical 
or cnemical cause, etc. Working conditions are respon-
sible for its incidence in any particular industrial 
surroundings for tts development along abnormal lines, 
for its gravity, for the type of symptoms which charac-
terise it, or for the aggravation of a common disease. 
[ i : 
5^  ANALYSIS or THE PROVISION; 
Sxob-section (2) of Section 3 refers to three 
classes of diseases* namely* those specified in parts 
A*B and C of Schedule III of the Act. These have been 
called occupational diseases, and they have been given 
a special protection envisaged by che provisions of the 
Act. Before the amendment of 1984 the Schedule III con-
tained a list of only 20 kinds of occupational diseases 
but now it contains a list of 34 kinds of occupational 
diseases which has been drawn up keeping in view the 
revised list of occupational diseases adopted by the 
International Labour Organisation in 1980. Diseases not 
falling under the diseases enumerated in this Schedule 
would not entitle, the workman to claim this special pro-
tection. He would have to prove such cases, under sub-
section (1) of section 3* 
(a) PMRT rt OF SCHEDULE III i- The contracting of any 
disease specified in Part A of the Schedule is sufficient 
to fix the liability upon the employer, as an 'injury by 
accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. 
To support any claim for compensation under Part A 
no specified period of employment is necessary. But if 
any such disease as mentioned in Part A of Schedule III 
develops after a workman has left the employment, no com-
pensation shall be payable to him. 
[),S 
Cb) PART B OF SCHEDULE III;- So far as diseases enxjine-
rated in part B of the Schedule is concerned the lia-
bility of the employer is fixed where the workman had 
continuously served the particular employer for a 
period of at least, six months in that particular em-
ployment. The periods of service under other employers 
in a similar employment can not be tacked together. The 
clause refers to cases under single employer. The em-
ployer shall also be liable to pay compensation to a 
workman where a workman contracts any disease specified 
in this part after he has left his employment and if it 
is proved that such disease arose out of the employment. 
(C) PART C OF SCHEDULE III;- This part contemplates 
service in the same kind of employment either under a 
single employer or under more than one employer. The 
period of service is not fixed as is the case in Part B 
but is dependent upon the decision of the Central Govern-
ment, made known by notification. 
Thus, if a workman contracts any of diseases 
specified in part rt,B and C of Schedule III as an occu-
pational disease peculiar to that employment, the con-
tracting of the disease shall be deemed to be an injury 
by accident within the meaning of this section unless 
contrary is proved the accident shall be deemed to have 
arisen out of, and in the course of employment. 
5fi 
The provisos to sub-section C2) further elaborate 
the scope of ' injury by accident ' re la t ing to diseases 
thereunder. In case of posit ive proof regarding the 
contracting of an occupational disease if ar is ing out 
of and in the course of employment, the period of cont i -
nuous employment/ i s less than the period specified in 
Part 'C* of Schedule III* i t would amount to injury by 
accident. The other par t of proviso deals with occupa-
t ional diseases as mentioned in Part B amd C contracted 
after the cessation of employment. If i t i s proved that 
the disease was contracted after cessation of employment 
in any employment mentioned in Part 'B ' or 'C* for a 
period of service mentioned in the sub-section, i t would 
aiTiount to injxiry by accident. 
But both provisos puts the onus upon the workman 
to proved) that the disease was contracted while in 
employment and out of i t and also (2) that he has served 
for the required length of service. 
I t becomes clear from above discussion that the 
diseases contracted by workmen vrtiile on duty i s a very 
serious problem and need to be tackled effectively. The 
ever increasing use of chemicals in the industry i s cons-
tant ly aggravating the si tuation and i t becomes incumbent 
upon the Government to closely monitor the s i tuat ion and i f 
necessary add further to the l i s t of diseases in the 
Schedule. 
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ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT 
The third most essential element of the section 
1 
3 is "arising out of and in the course of employment", 
which is very essential to prove for claim of compensa-
tion. The phrase is taken from the English Act of 1987. 
The phrase has received the greatest amount of judicial 
consideration, A never ending flood of cases dealing 
with the prober interpretation of this phrase continues 
to choke the law reports of the common law world. The 
fact that they continue to come suggests that .this appa-
rently simple phrase draws a line which is impossible 
2 
to determine with any certainty. Lord Macmillan saidx 
"that few words in the English language 
had been subjected to more microscopic 
Judicial analysis than these, and in 
the effort to expound them many criteria 
had been proposed and many paraphrases 
suggested. But it was manifestly- impossible 
to exhaust their content by definition, 
for the circumstances and incidents of 
employment were of almost infinite variety. 
This at least, however, could be said that 
the accident in order to give rise to a 
claim for compensation, must have some re-
lation to the workman's employment and 
must be due to risk incidental to that 
employment as distinguished from risk to 
which all members of the public were alike 
exposed". 
1. The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 
2. McC^ illvffl V. Northumbrain .qhippSgq Co.^td. (1932) 
147 L T. '56r 
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3 
In Golden Soap Factory (P) Ltd. case the Court said, 
"there is hardly any general principle which can be 
evolved to.explain and define the phrase but 
attempts have been made to explain it by classifioatlon 
viz, to the natxire* conditions/ obligations and incidents 
of the employment. Whether in a given case, an accident 
arises on the one hand out of the injxired person's emplo-
ment, although he has conducted himself in it carelessly 
or improperly* or, on the other hand, arises not out of 
his employment but out of the fact that he was outside the 
scope of it or has added to it some extraneous peril of 
nis own making, or has temporarily suspended it while he 
pursues some excxirsions of his own, or has quitted it al-
together, are all questions which, often as they arise, 
are susceptible of different answers by different minds 
as ejqplained by several well known Judges and Jurists and 
are always questions of nicety. So it is here I doubt if 
any universal test can be found. Analogies, not always 
so close as they seem to be at first sight, are often 
resorted to, but in the last analysis each case is decided 
on its own facts." 
3. Golden Soap Factory (P), Ltd. v. Nukul Chandra 
Mandal, AIR 1964 Cal. 217 
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The word "out of" and "in the course of employment" 
in section 3 are used - conjunctively and not disjvmctlvely^ 
the twin conditions/ that the accident arose in the course 
of the employment and out of the employment must both co-
exists before the employer can be said to have incurred 
liability to pay compensation. Lord President of the Court 
4 
of session, Scotland, in M' Lauchlan v, Anderson said, " I 
think it is impossible to have an accident arising out of, 
which is not also in the course of the employment, but the 
converse of tnis is quite possible". 
5 
The Bombay High Court in Trustees Port of Bombay, 
has made a distinction between "arising out of" and "ari-
sing in the course of employment" and held that letter 
suggests the point or time i.e. the injury must be caused 
during currency of employment and the former conveys the 
idea that there must be some sort of connection between 
the employment and the injury caused to ci workman as a re-
sult of accident,. 
6 
In Janki Ammal case , it was held that the accident 
alone does not give a workman a right to compensation. To 
entitle hixn to compensation at the hands of his employers, 
the accident must arise out of and in the course of the 
injiired workman's employment. Proof of one without the 
other will not bring the case within the Act. 
4. M; Lauchhan v. Anderson,(1911) SC 529 
5. Trustees Port of Bombay v. Yamunabai, AIR 1952, Bom.382 
6. Janki Animal v. Divisional Engineer, Highway, Kozhi Kode 
(1956) I I LL.J. 233 
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M- I.EXUS BETWEEN THE TWO PHRriSES: 
The phrase "in the course of employment" had already 
acquired a significance in the field of common law, in a 
different context, at the time of the introduction of 
workmen's compensation legislation in various countries of 
the world. The legislat\ires of almost all those countries 
instead of putting this phrase as expressing the sole con-
dition of employer's liability preferred to add one more 
condition expressed by another pharase "arising out of 
employment". The object of considering the relationship 
between these two phrases inter se is to answer the ques-
tion. Why legislatures imposed two simultaneous conditions 
instead of one? The mere fact that both the conditions are 
essential, makes it clear that both these phrases do not 
cover identical grounds. While considering the relationship 
7 
between the two phrases in Thom or Simpson Lord Shaw observed; 
"those words must be taken to signify something more in the 
sense of limitation than "in the course of "the employment, 
and that both of those e;qjressions condition must be satis-
fied before the Act can apply". 
It may be inferred that according to Lord Shaw, the phrase 
"in the coxirse of employment" cover wider ground tham the 
phrase "arising out of employment". Lord Dunedin in 
8 
Charles R Davidson case observed: "The addition of the 
words 'and in the course of are meant in some way either 
to qualify or further explain the words 'out o f . My own 
7. Ihom or Simpson v. Sinclair (1917) A.C. 127 
8. Charles R. Davidson 5 Co.v.M'Robb or Officer (1918) ri.C. 304 
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view is that they do the latter. It is in one sense 
difficult to imagine that there could be any injury held 
as arising out of the employment which would not also be 
in the coxirse of the employment". The principle under-
lying the above observation appears to be that all cases 
of claims 'arising out of the employment' will be covered 
by 'arising in the course of employment* which ultimately 
supports the proposition that the phrase 'in the course 
of employment" forms a bigger circle within the periphery 
of which the phrase 'arising out of the employment' forms 
8a 
another smaller circle. But this proposition does not 
appear to be the correct statement of the factual situation. 
There may be cases where the injury vrtiich arise "in the 
coxirse of employment" may not "arise out of the employment" 
and viz a viz. For example, a workman doing his duty at 
his normal working place in his employer's premises and 
during his normal working hours may be shot by another 
person by pistol from outside the premises through the 
window for personal enimity. The injury will clearly 
"arise in the coursa of employment" but will not "arise 
out of employment" because there is no casual relationship 
between the employment and the injury. Conversely, the 
injury may not arise in the course of employment. For 
example/ a workman, while of duty and enjoying his holiday 
at a picnic spot may be assaulted by another person v^om 
8a. Srivastava,o.C. : Social Security and Labour Laws, 
F. 69 (1984) 
6: r 
he might have annoyed while on duty and In the perfor-
mance of his duty. The injury will be clearly arising 
out of employment because the cause of assault his em-
ployment. But it will not be one arising in the course 
of his employment. 
The above discussion and illustration do not merely 
discard the relationship of "arising out of employment" to 
the phrase "in the course of employment" as a circle within 
a bigger circle but at the same time also establishes that 
the relationship between these two phrases is that of two 
intersecting circle where both cover same common area. Had 
it been correct to say that all cases arising out of em-
ployment would also be in the course of employment/ there 
would have been no necessity to add the phrase "arising 
in the course of employment" as a condition of employer's 
liability; only "arising out of employment" would have 
been a sufficient condition. But as pointed out it is not 
so and both condition are necessary to be proved to make 
a employer liable for compensation. And in order that an 
accident could be held to have arisen out of and in the 
9 
course of employment, it must be established. 
(1) that the workman was in fact employed on, or 
performing the auties of his employment at 
the time of the accident; 
9, Railways & Trading Co.Ltd. v. Sarswati Devi/AIR 1963 
Assam/ 127. 
bB 
{2) that the accident occured at or about the 
place where he was performing these duties; 
(3) that the immediate act which led to or 
resulted in the accident had some form 
of casual relation with the performance 
of these duties. 
It will be more easy to understand fully the phrase 
"arising out of and in the course of employment" if it is 
discussed separately in the following headings: 
1. Arising out of employment 
2. In the course of employment 
B-ARISING OUT OF EMPLOYMENT» 
The expression "arising out of employment" obviously 
means arising out of the work which the man is employed to 
do. The expression "out of" requires that there must be 
some sort of connection between the employment and the 
injury caused to a workman as a result of the accident. So, 
it is beyond any controversy that the phrase refers to the 
employment as an immediate cause or origin of the accident. 
The difficulty arises when attemp is made to find out whether 
the cause of an accident, resulting in the injury to a 
workman in a given circumstances or in a particular fact 
situation is the employment of the workman or something else. 
Once it is established that the cause of accident is'the 
employment of the workman, it goes without saying that the 
accident is one "arising out of the employment," 
67 
1. JUDICIHL DELINEATION OF THE SCOPE OF THE TERM: 
There are numerous English and Indian cases in 
which the meaning of the expression "accident arising 
out of the employment" has been discussed. Some of the 
decisions are conflicting. But the majority of them 
can be reconciled by talcing into accoxint the facts of 
each case and remembering that the appeals in such cases 
are on substantial questions of law and that the deci-
sion in each case« v^ether in favour of the workman or 
the employer^ was on eviddnce upon v^ich the competent 
authority or the court decided in the meumer it did. 
One principle that emerges from all these decisions is 
that whether the accident "arises out of employment or 
not" depends on the facts of each case; the accident must 
be connected with the employment and murt arise out of 
it/ there must be casual connection or association bet-
ween the employment and the accidental injury. The 
10 
Privy Council in Margaret Broket^ observed that if a 
workman is injvired by some natural force such as light-
ning, the heat of the sxin, or extreme cold* which in 
itself has no kind of connection with the employment, he 
can not recover unless he can sufficiently associate such 
injury with his employment. This he can do if he can 
show that the employment exposed him in a special degree 
10. Margaret Broker v. Thomas Borthwick & Sons,(1933)P.C.225 
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to suffering such an injiiry. But if he is injured by 
physical contact with some part of the place where he 
works, then apart from question of his own misconduct he 
at once associate the accident with his employment and 
nothing further need be considered. So that if the 
roof or walls fall upon him, or he slips upon the pre-
mises, there is no need to inake further enquiry as to why 
the accident happened. 
11 
In thom Lord HaldAne made a significant observation: 
"the question really terms on the character 
of the causation through the employment 
which is required by the words "arising out 
of**. Now it is to be obserkred that it is 
the employment which is pointed to be the 
distinctive cause, and not any particular 
kind of physical occurrence. The condition 
is that the employment is to give rise to 
the circumstances of injury by accident". 
The Courts in India also have decided many cases and found 
that each case must be decided on its own merits. It has 
12 
been observed in Bhagubai that there must be casual con-
nection between the accident and the employment in order 
that the court can say that the accident arose out of the 
employment of the deceased. 
Thus the phrase "arising out of employment" indi-
cates that the workmen's employment must be distinctive and 
11. Supra note, 7 
12. Bhagubai v. General Manager Central Railway,Bombay, 
(1954)11 -LL. J. 403, 406. 
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proximate cause of his personal injxiry and that phrase 
does not only mean tnat the personal injury must have 
resulted from his employment, but it also means that it 
is not limited to a case where the personal injury is 
referable to the mere nature of his employment that is 
to say the duties he has to discharge. If personal in-
jury can be attributed to the duties which he has to dis-
charge the workman would certainly be entitled to compen-
sation but he may also be entitled to compensation v^ere 
his personal injury is not directly connected with his 
duties. In deciding these type of cases the word employ-
13 
ment should not be defined in a narrow manner. While 
tnere is no general principle which can be said to deter-
mine that whether an accident arises out of employment or 
not, the following factor's may be generally taken into 
I3a 
considcrationi under the heading of casual connection), 
2. CASUAL CONNECTION; 
The expression "arising out of" provides and em-
phasizes the existence of a relation in the shape of course 
and effect between the employment and the accident. The 
employment is the cause and accident is the effect. If 
this casual relationship exist between an accident and 
13, Supra note, 3, 
13a. Supra note, 8a/P, 72 
() 
the employment, the accident arises out of employment. 
This casual relationship itself may be of various types. 
It may be direct, physical, proximate or indirect, 
abstract or remote. 
when a man runs a risk incidental to his employ-
ment causing injury, the injury arises out of his employe 
14 
ment. In Kondisetti Anlaiah ease where the workman was 
doing his work of attending a saw in the mill as a helper 
at the time of the accident and it was while he was in 
the act of helping in the cutting of the logs in the 
correct and proper manner by keeping the log in the guided 
area, which he attempted to do by pushing the log into 
position, that he sustained the accident, it was held that 
not only did the accident occur in the course of the ful-
filment of his duties,but it directly arose out of his 
employment. 
xiowever, in considering the special risk with 
which the workman is brought in contact by the conditions, 
ooligations, incidents and nature of his employment, it 
is not necessary that there should always be a direct, 
active or physical connection between the accident and 
the employment. It is sufficient, if the accident arises 
directly out or the circumstances which he had to encounter 
14. Kondisetti Anjalah v. T. Lakshmaiah , /\IR 1961 Andhra 
Pradesh, 15 
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15 
within the scope of his employment. In Ljpton's case 
Viacount Haldane observed: 
"though the expression 'arising out of 
no doubt imports some kind of casual 
relation with the employment, but it does 
not logically necessitate direct or phy-
sical causation. If there had been a hole 
or an unsually slippery place on the plat-
form which gave rise to the fall, that 
would have been a plain illustration of 
direct and also physical causation. But 
the statute does not prescribe such causa-
tion as this as being required before a 
claim can arise. The right given is no 
remedy for negligence on the part of the 
employer, but is rather in the nature of 
an Insurance of the workman against certain 
sorts of accident".16 
The facts of the case were as; the employer sent a fore-
man labourer by train from place A to place B to repair a 
water-main. After finishing his work the foreman pro-
ceeded to the station B in order to catch a train to 
return to place ^, The day was wet and windy, and, there-
fore, while on the arrival of the train, going hurriedly 
accross the platform he slipped and fell. As a result 
of the injury he finally died. Though there was no 
direct casual relationship between his employment and 
the accident, because the risk of the accident at the 
platform was not directly incidental to his employment. 
15. Lip ton V. G,C, Railway, 1924 A.C. 302 
16. Id., p. 306 
but was on the otherhand, conunon to all public, still 
it was held by the House of Lords that the accident 
arose out of employment. 
The Indian courts more or less have adopted the 
17 
same view. In Trustees, Port of Bombay, the appellant 
had employed Vinayak as a carpenter. One day v^ile he 
was working on his table which was in line with other work-
men's table, a bomb exploded. Vinayak received injuries 
and finally died in hospital the same night. On appeal, 
against the decision of the compensation commissioner,Mr, 
Justice Dixit of Bombay High Court was of the view that 
on the basis of the strict and literal interpretation, the 
expression "out of** conveyed the idea that there ought 
to be some sort of connection between the employment and 
the injury, but pointed out that the words "arising out of 
employment" are wide enough so as to cover a case, where 
there may not necessarily be a direct connection between 
the injury caused as a result of an accident and the em-
ployment of the workman. And there may be circumstances 
attending the employment, which would go to show that the 
workman received personal injury as a result of the accident 
arising out of his employment", 
rts Vinayak was to do the work at the particular 
time and at particular place which was a dangerous place 
17. Supra note, 5 
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by reason of the existence of a bomb/ where and when 
the explosion occured, it was held by learned judge 
that there was a circumstance attending his employment 
to show that there was casual connection between the 
accident and his employment, and therefore, the acci-
dent arose out of his employment. 
18 
In Macjcinnon r-lackenzie, where sheikh Ibrahim 
was employed as a seaman on the ship . He complained 
of pain in the chest but nothing abnormal could be 
detected by doctor. Some medicine was prescribed and 
he reported fit for work next day. Later on he com-
plained of insomnia, had sedative on medical advice. 
He was found missing and a search was made, the dead body, 
was not found . There was no direct evidence of his 
death. The Supreme Court, setting aside the order of the 
bombay High Court, held that, there must be casual conn-
nection between the accident and the employment in order 
to give rise to a claim under the Compensation Act, The 
expressidin 'arising out of the employment', applies to 
employment as such to its nature, its conditions,its 
Obligations and its incidents, the workman may be brought 
within the zone of special danger without exposing him-
self to an added peril by his imprudent act, these need 
18. Mackinon Mackenzie & Co.(P) Ltd. v, Ibrahim Mohd. 
Issak, AIR 1970 SC 906 
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not be proved by direct evidence but may be inferred 
from proved facts but here there was no 'material for 
holding that the seaman met with his death on account 
of an accident which 'arose out of employment'. 
19 
In Director (T&M) ,DNK Project , a factory worker having 
a heart disease, while coming out of the factory, pro-
fusely sweated and died after fo\ir hours of work inside 
the factory premises. The question was whether the 
accident arose out of and in the course of employment. 
It was observed tnat the most JLmportant phrase in sec-
tion 3(1) of the Act is "arising out of and in the course 
of employment". It is xuiderstood to mean that the injury 
has resulted during the course of employment from some 
risk incidental to the duties of the service, which unless 
engaged in the duty owing to the master, it is reasonable 
to believe the wor3anan would not otherwise have suffered. 
In other words, there must be a casual relationship 
between the accident and the employment. The court 
observed that the stress and strain of the four hours 
of work the deceased nad, must be taken to be an accela-
rating factor in giving the final blow on account of 
which the deceased died and therefore the employer is 
liable to pay compensation under the Act. 
19. Director (T&M),DNK Project v. Smt. Buchittalli, 
(1989) I LL.J. 259 
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There are nxomerous causes of an accident, out 
of which some are proximate and others remote. If the 
employment of a workman is the proximate cause of an 
accident (the Remoter causes need not be considered at 
all which might possibly be discovered by going back 
along a train of circumstances) it is said that the acci-
dent arose out of the employment of the vorkman. In than 
20 
or Simpson case» a fish curer was working in a shed be-
longing to her employer when an adjoining wall, not under 
her employer's control, fell and brought down part of 
the shed, causing her serious injury. The roof fell 
because of the falling of another wall which was being 
constrcted at the adjoining land by its proprietor. 
Viscount Haldane of the House of Lords observed that the 
court is directed to look at what has happened proximately, 
and not to search for causes or conditions laying behind. 
It was held that as the cause of the injury, namely, the 
collapse of the particular shed in which she was working, 
was a special danger attached to the locality in which 
she was placed by her employment, the accident arose out 
21 
of the employment, Halsbury's Laws of England has the 
following on the effect of above observation: "the 
decision in this case overruled a number of earlier de-
cesions and finally negatived the view which had previously 
20. Supra n o t e 7 
2 1 . 2nd E d . , V o l . XXXIV, P . 832 
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been suggested/ that in order to arise out of the 
employment, an accident must be one of a kind to which 
the workman was particularly liable by reason of the 
natvire of his employment. It is not necessary that the 
act causing the accident should have any direct or 
physical connection with the employment; it is sufficient 
if the accident arises directly out of circumstances 
which were encountered because it was within the sphere 
of the workman's employment to encounter them." 
In Indian cases namely: 
In Bhag\ibai case a workman employed as a mukadam by the 
railway, had the access from his quarter to the station 
only through the compound of the railway quarters. One night 
he was stabbed by some unknown person at about midnight 
when he had Just left his cjuarter to Join his duty. Mr. 
Chief Justice Chagla observed: 
"it is clear that there must be a casual 
connection between the accident and the 
employment in order that the court can 
say that the accident arose out of the 
employment of the deceased. It is 
equally clear that the cause contemplated 
is the proximate cause and not any remote cause" 
The Chief Justice after discussing a nvimber of other 
cases on the point relied upon the decision of the House 
of Lords in Thorn's case and held that the accident arose 
22. Supra note ,12 
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Out of the employment of the work. The proximate 
connection between the employment and the injxiry was 
the fact that when the deceased was assaulted and died, 
he was in the course of his employment. 
23 
In Naima Bibi case, a workman of the colliery 
while returning home after duty, was murdered within the 
premises of the employer. Held that tnece was casual 
and proximate connection between the accident and the 
employment since the workman was on the spot only for 
his employment, personal injxiry was caused to the work-
man by an accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment. 
23, Kaima Bibi v. I^ odhna Colliery Co.Ltd. (1977) 
I I I4L,J. 69 
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^ _ IN THE COURSE OF EI-1PL01S4ENT 
The phrase " in the course of employment" first 
acquired currency in the field of law torts to determine 
master's liability towards third parties for wrongs com-
1 
mitted by his servant. 
In workman's compensation statutes* also, the ex-
2 
pression " in the course of employment" delineates the 
limits of master's liability. But, perhaps tnat is the 
only similarity, the problem here is to determine emplo-
yer's liability towards his own workman, not third parties. 
Thus despite the identity of phraseology and the ultimate 
result of interpretation, the problem in the two fields 
are really different and decision-makers should keep tne 
distinct policy considerations in view. 
The expression "in the course of employment" suggests 
the point of time, that is to say, the injury must be 
caused by an accident taking place in the course of the 
employment, which means during the course of the employment. 
Tne phrase "in the course of employment" presents two 
principal questions. The first concerns the period of 
employr.ent. The second raises the question as to how far 
the servant during the period of employment places himself 
1. Winfield on Tort, P.P. 741 - 754 
2. o.3U) of Tne Workmen's Compensation act, 192 3. 
1A 
outside thereof by doing that of which he is not emp-
loyed to do, or by doing his appointed work at a place 
other than that which his master has appointed for that 
purpose, or by deliberately adopting a method of per-
forming the work other than that prescribed by his master 
or forbidden by him. "In tne covirse of employment" does 
not mean " in the course of industrial work". The course 
of employment, therefore, is neither limited to the 
period of actual labour nor is it extended to include 
all acts necessiated by the workmen's employment. 
The workman in order to be entitled to compensation 
should be acting in the course of his employment. A 
workman is acting in the course of his employment when 
he is engaged "in doing something ne was employed to do" 
or what is, inother and better words, in effect the same 
thing namely when he is doing something in discharge of 
a duty to his employer's directly or indirectly imposed 
upon him by his contract of service. The true ground 
upon which the test should be based is duty to the emp-
loyer arising out of the contract of employment but it 
is to be borne in mind that the word "employment" as here 
used covers and includes things belonging to or arising 
out of it. The man is not in the course of his employment 
unless the facts are such that it is in the course of his 
employment and in performance of a duty under his contract 
3ri 
of service that he is found in the place where the 
accident occurs. If there is only a right and no 
obligation binding on the man in the matter of his 
employment there is no liability, 
X . JUDICIA DSLIIMEATIQN OF THE SCOPE OF THE TERM; 
The statutory requirement to hold employer's 
liable for personal injxiries caused to workmen by acci-
dents, that it must have arisen in the course of employ-
ment has been delineated by courts on the basis of the 
duty of the injured workman, for which he is required 
to work/ time under which he Is required to work and 
2a 
the place where he is required to work. The three di-
mensional requirement is not amenable to easy solution. 
2 . ELEl-tENT OF DUTY; 
Two trends of judicial decisions are generally 
found regarding the element of duty. According to first 
trend in order to find out whether an accident falls in 
the course of employment or not, it is necessary to 
find out whether the workman was doing at the time of 
the accident his duty for which he was employed or not. 
And according to second trend the duty is not essential: 
an accident may fall in the course of employment even 
though at the time of the accident the workman might net 
have been doing the duty for which he is employed. 
2a. Srivastava, s.C.; Social Security and 
i-abour Laws, p. 77 (iges) 
8 
(4) DUTY IS ESSENTIAL t 
3 
There is catena of cases holding workman in the 
course or their employment on the ground that at the 
time of tne accident they were doing their duties for 
which they were employed. Similarly, there is no paucity 
4 
of cases in v^ich they have been hold not in the course 
of employment on the ground that at the time of the acci-
dent they were not doing their duties for which they were 
employed. 
5 
In St. Helens Colliery Co., an employee of the 
company was injured in a railway accident while travelling 
in a special colliery train from his work to his home. 
6 
Considering a good number of earlier decisions and finding 
it difficult to reconcile them Lord Atkinson felt the 
necessity of laying down a test to determine the "course 
of employment" of a workman and suggested that the "true 
ground upon which the test should be based is a duty to 
the employer arising out of the contract of employment. 
His Lordship referred to an earlier decision of the House 
7 
of Lords in Parker case, in support of his conclusion,where 
3. Janki Ammal v. Divisional Enqg. (1956)II LL.J.233; 
weaver v, Tredqear Iron Co., C1940)3 All E.R.157;John 
Stewart & Son U912) LtciTv. Lonqhurst, (1917) A.C. 249 
4. St. Helens Colliery Co.v. Hewitson(1924)^.C. 59; 
Ceremins v. (Juest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd.(1908)1 K.D.469 
Tobacco Manufs.Ltd.v. Marian Stewart,AIK 1950 Cal.164 
5. Supra note, 4 
6. Davies v . Rhymney I r o n Co. L td . (1900) 16 T.L. / i . 329; 
Moore V. Manches te r L i n e r s L t d . , (1910) ^,C. 498; 
C h a r l e s R. Davidson & Co. v . 2-1'Robb or O f f i c e r , (1918)*i.C. 
7 . P a r k e r v . Ship Black Rock (Owners) ,A.C. 725,729 304 
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a fireman on board a steamship had gone ashore with leave 
to buy some provisions for himself and on returning to 
his ship had fallen off the pier and was drowned, it 
was held that in order to bring the accident within the 
ambit of the phrase "arising out of employment"/ "the 
absence from the vessel must be in pursuance of a duty 
owed to the employer". His Lordship concluded that X was 
not in the course of employment as there was no obligation 
on him to use the train. 
Indian Courts have taken the similar view. 
6 
In Tobacco Manufacturers Ltd. case, Lionel iienry Stewart, 
a mechanic was employed by Kessers Tobacco Manufacturers 
Ltd. One day while he was going to his work riding a 
bicycle provided by the employer met witli an accident by 
a lorry and ultimately succuinbed to his injuries. Mr. Jus-
tice Banarjee of the Calcutta High Court tindintj no evi-
dence to substantiate the claim that at tlie time of the 
accident. Henry Stewart was doing his duty held that the 
em^jloyer was not liable to pay compensation. Mr. Justice 
Ramaswami of the l.adras High Court in Janki Ammal case 
observed: "the workman, in order to bring his case within 
the Workmen's Compensation ..»ct, must show that he was at 
the time of the injury engaged in the employers business 
or in furthering that business and was not doing something 
9 for his own benefit or accommodation". 
B. Supra note, 4 
9. Supra note, 3 
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(b ) DUTY NOT ESSENTIAL; 
10 
In R. V, Industrial Injuries Commissioner's case 
under National Insurance (Industrial Injiiries) Act, 1965 
the Court of Appeal obser-vedx " The mistake which 
the courts made in the early days was ^o Interpret the 
workmen's Compensation Act too narrowly . Even the House 
of Lords did not appreciate the social significance of 
tills legislation. They debarred men from compensation 
when Parliament thought they ought to have it". Referring 
to the earlier decisions of the House of Lords in St. 
12 13 
Helens and Parker cases ,LOrd Denning observed: 
"Those decisions give me a shock even nov/, 
that the House should have decided them 
as they did .... this idea that a duty is 
necessary is all wrong. It does not 
stand with the decision ot the House of 
Lords itself in Armstrong , Whitworth & Co. 
V, Redford...., where there was no duty 
on the young woman to go to and from the 
Canteen/ yet she was held to be in the 
course of employment".14 
His Lordship reinforced his view by two more decisions 
15 
of the House of Lords, namely. Knight v. Wail Ltd. and 
16 
the Harris case and laid down tliat "a man can be said to 
act in tlie course of his employment even if he was doing 
17 
sometning which it was not his duty to do". 
10. (1966) 1 ^11, E.K. 97 
11. Id., Pi. 10 1-10 2 
12. Supra note 4 
13. Supra note 7 
14. Supra note 10 
15. K19^B) 4 All E.,R. 667 
16. Harris v. ^^ssociated Portland Cement rifts. Ltd., 1939 
17. supra note 10 *^ *^ * "^^ 
S4 
18 
In Knight's case a workman was injured in a canteen 
provided by the employer in his premises. Although 
workman injured %^ile taking his Ivinch during the Ivinch 
break and was not doing any duty* it was held by the Court 
of Appeal that_the workman was in.the cause-of this enploy-
ment at the time 9f injury. 
19 
In Harris case according to Lord Atkin, if acci-
dents happen to workmen the test should be, "vrtiether the 
perils are those which he in fact encounters while doing 
the work vrtiich he is employed or authorised to do", word 
"authorised to do" may cover even those cases in which it 
is not his duty to do a particular work but he is en-
titled to do if he may ao like, for example to take lunch 
in canteen or to travel in train specially arranged for 
workmen by the employers. This view does not merely dis-
card the test of 'duty* but also makes it clear that it 
is a determination of fact as to whether an accident falls 
in the course of employment or not and no xiniversal test 
applicable to all cases can be laid down. 
It appears at the first sight that the two views 
are contradictory to each other but if they are looked in 
a wider perspective they mean to a great extent the same-
thing. This will become more clear by the examination of 
concept of duty. 
18. Supra note 15 
19. Supra note 16 
Sfi 
L C ) CONCEPT OF DUTY; There are two concept of duties 
which are as follows: 20 
ia) Liberal concept; Lord Atkinson, in Hewitson casewhile 
emphasizing the element of duty as a determinative factor 
in the determination of the course of employment took 
duty in a wider sense. He considers the term "employ-
ment" to comprehend "things belonging to or arising out 
of it". His Lordship, while illustrating the wide scope 
of the concept of duty, observed: " For instance, hay-
makers in a meadow on a very hotday are, I think, 
doing a thing in the coxirse of their employment if they 
go for a short time to get some cool water to drink to 
enable them to continue the work they are bound to do, 
and without %^ich they could not do that work/ and workmen 
are doing something in the course of their employment 
when they ceases working for the moment and sit down on 
their employer's premises to eat food to enable them to 
21 
continue their labours." 
22 
In Weaver's case» a collier was injured by being caught 
up in a press of fellow workmen while trying to board 
a train on a platform owned/ managed and controlled for 
the use of workmen by a railway company which ran the 
railway line through the colliery premises owned by the 
employer. The House of Lords held that at the time of 
20. Supra note, 4 
21. Id./ P. 71 
22. Supra note, 3 
8f> 
the accident,he was in the course of employment as 
he was doing the duty to leave the employment. Refer-
ring to this case# Mr. Justice Subba Rao of the Supreme 
23 
Coxirt in BEST Undertaking case observed: 
"This decision while it did not discard 
the test of*duty' gave it a wider 
meaning than that given by the earlier 
decisions. It was the duty of the 
employee to go to the workspot and leave 
it and it would be his duty to leave it 
by means of transit provided by the 
employer". 
In this wider sense duty may include all those acts which 
a workman may do because of his employment irrespective 
of the fact whether he is bound to do it or entitled to 
do it. If he is doing a work vrfiich he could not have done 
but for his employment then he is doing a duty and is in 
tne course of his employment. 
(•) Narrow Concept : 
The supporters of the second view have discarded 
the test of duty merely because they want to include in 
the course of employment, the accident arising to a 
workman (a) while taking meal in a canteen during the 
24 
lunch break,(b) while staying on employer's premises 
25 
during the midday dinner hour and eating his dinner , (c) 
26 
while waiting -to^ f^lo into smoking booth during a break. 
These circumstances do not amount to discharge of duty by 
the workmen. 
23. B.E.s.T. Undertaking v. Mrs. Agens (1963) II LLrj. 
,. o ,r &1S at 620 
24. Supra note,15 
25. BIOVPT^- V sawver, (1904) 1 K.B. 271 
26. supra not6, 10 
8 : 
t\3 we have already seen these circiomstances are 
included in the wider concept of duty taken by the 
supporters of the first view. The conclusion is that 
whichever view may be taken by the decision makers 
they must give wider scope to the phrase "in the course 
of employment", 
(£) DETERMINATION OF DUTY; 
Neither it has been thoroughly investigated by 
courts nor is it advisable to lay down any general prin-
ciple as to the circumstances under which workman will be 
treated as doing his duty. However, the Supreme Court 
has observed: 
"The exigencies of the service, the practice 
obtaining therein and the nature of the 
service would be the guiding factors to as-
certain the scope of the duty, 27 
28 
In Kamla case , Devranjan, a lascar in the Madras Port 
Trust dredger working under tne supervision of Mr,Watts, 
an engineer, was asked by him ( Mr. watts) to go to his 
(Wlatts) house and fetch his night dinner. While returning 
from »<att's house«he was knocked down by a lorry as a con-
sequence of which he died on the spot. The Additional 
Commissioner for workmen's compensation held that Devranjan 
did not meet witn his ueath as a result of an accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment because 
27 , Supra n o t e , 2 3 
28 . Kama l a v , Madras P o r t T r u s t , 1966) I LL . J . 690 
8 
it was not his duty to bring food for the offices. In 
an appeal to the Madras High Coxirt, Mr. Justice Venkatadri 
observed: 
29 
The Act does not expressly say that the 
employee must, at the time of the injury, 
have been benefiting the employer. It 
merely says that the injury must have 
arisen in the course of the employment, 
so that if he can show that the particular 
activity, beneficial or not, was indeed 
a part of his employment either because of 
its general nature or because of the par-
ticular custom and practice in the indivi-
dual concern, the statute is satisfied 
and held that the workman died of an 
accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment. Thus the custom and 
the practice of a concern may be relevant 
factors in determination of duty of the 
servants of that concerns 
tgj COKGLUSIVENESS OF THE TEST OF DUTY; 
The problem of conclusiveness of the test of 
duty, though, has not been raised directly in any parti-
cular case, the possibility of such problems being raised 
in future cannot be totally overruled. Problems may 
arise v^ere a clerk employed in a factory might receive 
injury while completing the arears of his file work, 
not in the factory premises but in his own house and 
that too during off time. There is no doubt that he 
would be deemed to have received the injury while doing 
his duty arising out of his employment but will he also 
30 
be held in the course of employment is doubtful^ 
29. Supra note , 2 ' 
30. Borlev v. Ockenoen, (1925) 2 K.B. 325 
8:/ 
In most of the cases element of duty would be 
conclusive test but there are certain observation which 
suggest that in border line cases duty alone would not 
be sufficient. According to Lord Loreburn L.C, the^e 
are three incjuiries which must be made before an accident 
may be held in the course of employment of a workman, 
(1) Whether his act was such as he might 
reasonably do while employed? 
\,2) Did the accident occur within the time 
covered by the employment 7 
(3) Did the accident occur at a place where 31 
he may reasonably be while in the employment? 
The above three enquiries may guide to determine the 
border line cases. This also suggest that duty is not 
conclusive test in all cases. In some cases it may become 
necessary to examine other elements like time and place 
. alsO/ 
3. ELEMENT OF TIME AND PLACE : 
If a workman is injurred by accident during his 
normal working hours^ at a place specified for his working* 
and while doing his duty* there is no problem and the 
accident is clearly in the course of his employment. The 
problem arises when all of these three factors, namely time, 
place and duty do not coincide. In Fitzgerald v. W.G.Clark 
31. Moore v. Manchester Liners Ltd. (1910) /i.e. 500 
on 
32 
and Sons/ buckley, L.J. , while explaining tne 
phrase "arising out of" and "in the course ol em-
ployment" observed: 
"The words 'out of' point, I think, to tne 
origin or cause of thie accident; the v.ords 'in the 
course o f to the time, place, and circumstances under 
which the accident takes ^.lace. Tne former words are 
descriptive of the character or quality of the accident. 
The latter words relate to the circumstances under 
wnich an accioent of uiat ciiaracLor qudlity takes place. 
According to Mr. Justice ijixit of the uombay High Court, 
the expression "in the course of employment" suggests 
the point of time; tliat is to say, tho injury must be 
caused by accident taking place in tiie course of the 
employment; that is, during the currency of the emjiloy-
33 
ment. 
34 
In McDonald case v/here an employee, McDonald 
was injured and killed by falling off the gangway and 
striking on iron girder while returning on board his 
employer's ship from the shore. Court of Appeal re-
versing the award of the country court held that 
McDonald was' not in the course of his employment at 
the time of the accident. 
32. Fitzgerald v. W.G. Clark U Sons, (1908),2 K.B.796 
3 3. Trustees, Port of bombay v. Yamund bai,AlR ^^ 
1952 Bom.382 at 383 
34. McDonald v. Owners of j.5. BananaU908)2 K.n.926 
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stressing the role of 'place* in the determination of 
the course of employment of a workman it has been 
correctly pointed outs 
It is part of his duty both to go and to proceed 
from the work upon which he is engaged, and so long as 
he is in a place in which persons other than those so 
engaged would have no right to be, and indeed,in which 
he himself would have no right to be,but for the work on 
which he is employed, he would, I think .normally still 
35 
be in the course of his employment, 
36 
In Saurashtra salt Hfg. Company, the Supreme 
Court had opportunity to deal with this element of place 
where in Mr, Justice Imam laid down the following rule: 
"It is well settled that when a workman is 
on a public road or a public place or on 
a public transport he is there as any other 
member of the public and is not there in 
the course of his employment unless the very 
nature of his employment makes it necessary 
for him to be there, A workman is not in 
the course of his employment froia the moment 
he leaves his home and is on his way to his 
work. He certainly is in the course of his 
employment if he reaches the place of work 
or a point or an area which comes within the 
theory of notional extension,outside of which 
the employer is not liable to pay compensa-
tion for any accident happening to him". 
Fran the aforesaid decision it is evident that though the 
time and place of work can not play a decisive role, it 
certainly plays a significant role and should not be ignored 
in deterroialng the question of the "course of employment". 
35. Supra note , 3 
36, saurashtra Salt Hfg.Company Ltd. v. Bai Valu Raja 
i 1958) II L.L.J. 249 at 251 
Q'? 
From the above discussion it can be concluded 
that the phrase in the course of employment suggests* 
the point of time that is to say, the injxiry must be 
caused by accident taking place during the currency of 
the employment. The employee must in order to bring 
his case within the Act, show that he was at the time 
of injury engaged irv the employer's trade or business 
or in furthering that trade or business and was not 
doing something for his own benefit or accomodation, or 
that he was doing something in discharge of a duty to 
his employer directly or indirectly imposed upon him by 
his contract of service. Apart from time factor and 
place factor, the facts and circumstances of each case 
must be taken into account to ascertain that the injury 
comes within the scope of the phrase "in the course of 
employment". 
ii:> 
a, DQCTaiN£ OF ADDED PSHIL . 
Workers while performing their duties, sometimes 
adopt means to accomplish their ends in a way which are 
either unwarranted or the adoption of which are liable to 
increase the risk involved in the execution of the work. 
If there is only one mode of doing a particular work and 
the worker.-suffers an injury while performing the work by 
adopting that mode the injury will be said to arise both 
"in the course" as well as "out of" the employment. On 
the other hand..if there are various alternative ways of 
doing the work the worker is expected to adopt the least 
risky method/ i.e. the worker will not be entitled to 
choose a more risky method and thus add peril to the Job, 
and claim compensation for this added peril, if the injury 
is caused on account of the added peril. If at the time 
of accident, the workman arrogates to himself duties for 
which he was neither employed nor entitled to perform the 
37 
accident is not said to arise out of the employment. 
i^rrogated duty means acting v/ithout instructions. In 
38 
Lanchashire & Yorkshire Railway case, negativing the claim 
Viscount Haldane observed that "added peril" means: 
a peril voluntarily superinduced on what arose out of the 
employment to which the workman was neither required nor 
39 
had authority to e:q>ose himself. Rigk of accidents falling 
J7. Infra note 41 
38. Lanchashire & Yorkshire Railway Co.v. Hiqley, (1917) 
39. Id., P. 361 «.C. 352 
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under t h e c a t e g o r y o£ added p e r i l and n o t i n c i d e n t a l 
t o t h e employment may a r i s e i n v a r i o u s ways. Some of 
t h e s e may a p p r o p r i a t e l y be c o n s i d e r e d h e r e . 
1- JLJQING SOMETHING OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF Ei-lPL0 i^3>tENT; 
A workman may add some p e r i l h i m s e l f by going o u t -
s i d e t h e sphe re of h i s employment and i t may be p o s s i b l e 
i n such c a s e s t o h o l d t h e a c c i d e n t s r e s u l t i n g from such 
a c t s of t h e workman n o t a r i s i n g o u t of h i s employment. 
T h i s t e s t of s p h e r e of employment was f i r s t l y l a i d down 
40 
by Lord J u s t i c e C o l l i n i n Whithed c a s e . His L o r d s h i p 
p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n whe the r a s e r v a n t had v i o -
l a t e d an o r d e r was n o t c o n c l u s i v e of whether an a c c i d e n t 
so c a u s e d d i d o r d i d n o t a r i s e o u t of t h e employment and 
s a i d t h a t t h e t e s t i n such c a s e s would b e : d i d t h e o r d e r 
which was d i s o b e y e d l i m i t s t h e sphe re of t h e employment 
o r was i t m e r e l y a d i r e c t i o n n o t t o do c e r t a i n t h i n g s , o r 
t o do them i n a c e r t a i n way w i t h i n t h e sphere of t h e em-
p loymen t? Lord Ounedin r e f e r r i n g t o t h i s t e s t w i th a p p r o v a l 
41 
i n Plxunb c a s e f u r t h e r h e l d t h a t i f a workman was i n j u r e d 
w h i l e t r a n s g r e s s i n g a p r o h i b i t i o n l i m i t i n g t h e sphe re of 
h i s employment t h e a c c i d e n t d i d n o t a r i s e o u t of h i s 
employment . But I f he was i n j u r e d w h i l e t r a n s -
g r e s s i n g t h e p r o h i b i t i o n of c e r t a i n t h i n g s of c o n d u c t s 
40 . Whithed v . R e a d e r (1901) , 2 K.B, 48 
4 1 . Plxjmnb v . Cobden F l o u r M i l l s , (1914) A.C, 62 
Hf. 
within the sphere of his employment then the accident 
arose out of his employment. The basis of the test of 
the sphere of employment is nothing but an added peril. 
Where the prohibition is not specific and express 
then in such cases the general view of the nature of the 
employment will determine the sphere of employment. In 
42 
Gouri Kinkar , a workman was employed as a piecer in the 
?>4Dning department of <i cotton mill. He was injured in 
trying to remove a torn spindle banding from the tin rollers 
while they were in motion though there was no specific pro-
hibition not to remove the torn spindle binding, it was 
clearly no part of his duty to do it. Mr. Chief Justice 
Rankin of the Calcutta High Court found the fact that the 
injury was occasioned by an added peril and held that the 
accident did not arise out of the employment. 
2- CARELESSNESS/ NEGLIGENCE Od WILFUL MISCONDUCT OF THE 
WORKMAN : 
The problem of carelessness, negligence or wilful 
misconduct arises in a limited area of cases. It has already 
been seen that if the workman receives injuries while acting 
outsiae the sphere of employment the accident by which the 
injury results does not arise out of his employment, irres-
pective of the fact as to whether there was on his part anyqare-
lesanessf negligence, wilful misconduct or not. 
42. Gouri Kinkar v. Radha Kissen Mills, AIR 1933,Cal.220 
Ijf. 
If a workman acts in a careless/ negligent or 
some other way amoiinting to wilful misconduct but within 
tl;e Si^ here of his employment and is injured because of 
that/ the accident by which injury results arises out of 
43 
his employment. In Stephen case a farm servant who was 
driving a reaping machine drawn by two horses found that 
a chaintrace had become loose. In order to refix the chain 
he without putting the cutting blade out of gear walked 
along the pole to reach the necessary spot. The horses 
started forward and therefore he fell from the pole on 
the cutting blade and was seriously injured. It was found 
as a fact that the act of balancing was not done for the 
purpose of and in connection with his employer's trade or 
business* " but was a foolhardy act of bravado". House of 
Lords rejected the contention of the workman to claim com-
pensation on the following ground: 
A part altogether from the question of serious 
misconduct/ if the accident arises from some peril to 
which the workman has exposed himself by his own conduct 
and which he was not obliged to encounter by any term of 
his contract of service, the accident can not be said to 
44 
arise out of his employment. 
43, Stephen v. Cooper, (1929) A.C. 570 
44. Id./ P. 573 - 574 
r: 
45 
In Harris case, the work entailed standing in water, 
the workman tied rough sack leggings round his legs 
to protect his trousers. Employers permitted him to dry 
tlie sacking at the unfenced orifice of the revolving 
fan of a turbine. One day finding the leggings of another 
workman at a place where he used to keep , he wished to 
put his own leggings in the inner casing near the revol-
ving fan. While doing so his hand was caught by the fan 
and had to be amputated. Rejecting the contention of the 
employer, the House of I,ords distinguished the present 
46 
case from that of Stephen's on the ground that whereas 
in 3tepen the workman had gone beyond the sphere of his 
employment, in the present case the workman was acting 
within the sphere of his employment and mere negligence 
of the workman was not sufficient to hold that the accident 
did not arise out of the employment. 
3- DOING SOMETHING FOR HIS OWN PURPOSE : 
The injury, which results to a workman as a result 
of an accident arising from such act which he does for 
his own purposes leaving his actual job for the time being, 
does not arise out of his employment irrespective of the 
fact as to whether he is injured at the time and place of 
45, Harris v. rtssociatjed Portland Cement Manufacturers 
Ltd,I 1939# A.c. 71' 
46. Supra note 30 
UK li 
his employment: or not. In such cases it is deemed 
that the workman exposes himself to the risk of the 
accident and therefore the accidents . are covered by 
the doctrine of added peril. 
47 
The House of Lords decision in Reed case is an 
authority on the point, ^n engine driver got off his 
engine at a station for his own private purpose, namely 
to get a book from a friend and went across one pair of 
rail . While returning to his engine he was knocked 
down by a wagon which was being shunted and as a result 
of it he died. Lord Hshbourne observed: 
" The evidence shows that it was for a 
purpose of his own and not in the exe-
cution of his duty or in the interest 
of his employment, that the injured man 
esqposed himself to the risk which caused 
his death,48 
and held that the accident to the engine driver did not 
arise out of his employment. 
Thus the proof of added peril will bar the workmen 
from successfully claiming his compensation. 
47. Reed v. Great Wescern Railway, (1909) A.C. 31 
48. Id., P. 33 - 34 
* it it * it * M H k if ii it * it K * * tc it *t It * it it * * * k * tr -k It * * k It ic ii *t -k * it it ** 
* * 
^ C h a p t e r - I V ^ 
* * 
* * 
* NOTIONAL EXTENSION OF EMPLOYER'S * 
* * 
* PREMISES * 
* * 
* * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
9:^  
NOTIONAL EXTENSION OF EMPLOYER'S PREMISES 
If personal injury is caused to a workman by an 
accident arising out of and in the course of employment/ 
employer shall be held liable for compensation. But prob-
lems becomes difficult when a workman . receives inju-
ries just before his journey or Just after leaving the work 
of the day or near the place of his work but not exactly at 
the place of his work. The natural question in such cases 
would be; Was he, at the time of the accident doing his duty 
during his normal working hours at his normal working place? 
Strictly speaking the answer would be 'no*. It is well es-
tablished that for the purpose of workmen's compensation a 
person's employment does not in general begin until he has 
reached the place where he is to work and does not continue 
after he has left it and if he receives injuries before rea-
ciiing or after leaving the work place he will be without any 
relief. The Journey to and from the place of employment are 
generally excluded. But in order to relax the rigour of the 
rule and to include some genuine cases of injuries which 
arises Just before reaching or after leaving the work-place, 
the theory of notional extension has been evolved. The 
iljf) 
theory of Notional Extension is also based upon the 
nature of legislation. Wortanen's Compensation Act is 
a social welfare or remedial legislation and under the 
purview of the Act# judiciary had tried to give more and 
more benefits to the workers who are generally victimised 
by the employers. These employers may be government it-
self or private persons. 
In Saurashtra salt Mfg, Company case/ Justice Imam 
of the Supreme Coxirt observed; " As a general rule, the 
employment of a workman does not commence until he has 
reached the place of employment and does not continue when 
he has left the place of employment, the Journey to and 
from the place of employment being excluded. It is now 
well-settled/ that this is subject to the theory of notional 
extension of the employer's premises so as to include an 
area which the workman passes and repasses in going to and 
leaving the actual place of work. There may be some rea-
sonable extension in both time and place and a workman may 
be regarded as in the course of his employment even though 
he had not reached or had left his employer's premises". 
The above observation of Supreme Court raises two 
important questions; First when and where does according to 
this theory of notional extension, tl^ie employment of a work-
man commence? And second, when and where does it comes to 
1. Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Company v, Bai Valu Kaja, .(1958) 
II. LL.J. 249 
101 
an end? But a more fundamental question than these 
two isJ what is the basis ot this theory of notional 
extension? The answer of the former two question will 
depend largely upon the answer of the latter. 
M- BASIS OF NQTiON/iL EXTElwIOH : 
This theory of notional extension has been mostly 
applied to four types of cases. First, cases of injury 
to workmen employed in workshops, factories or other 
such establishment. Second, cases of injuries to work-
men employed in harbour or on ships. Third, cases of 
injury to workmen employed in transport services. Lastly 
2 
cases of injury to workmen employed in mines. 
Keeping in view the special nature of the cases 
where notional extension theory generally applies, the 
observation of Bachawat, J, in Commissioners for Port of 
2a 
Calcutta, is worthy to be mentioned. He said: "Some 
special feature of the employment may extend the course 
of employment so as to include within it other times and 
other places A personal injury caused to the employee 
by accident in a public street or in a public place does 
not arise in the course of his .employment unless the em-
ployee is then rendering service to his employer or is 
then discharging some obligation imposed upon him by the 
contract of employment". 
2, Srivasta va, S.C,;Social Security ** i^DOur J-aws/P.bU 11985) 2a Commissioners for Port of Calcutta v. Kaniz Fatema, 
*rtIK,1961, Cal. 310. 
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So, in some cases the basis of the notional ex-
tension is considered to be an implied term of the con-
tract, while in others it is the proved or practical 
3 
necessity. In Vardaraj lu Naidu , a workiridn was injured 
on way to his work spot by capsizing of the lorry belong-
ing to the employer and driven by servant, in which he 
was being conveyed along with other workmen to the spot. 
In an appeal Madras High Coxirt held that the workman, 
though received injuries before reaching tne work spot, 
was at the time of the accident, in the course of his em-
ployment on the ground of implied obligation and proved 
necessity to use the lorry . There is no rigidity in this 
respect and either o£ these two bases may he used in any 
particular case falling in any one of the above mentioned 
four categories depending upon the facts and circumstances 
of the case. 
In reality the implied term of contract and proved 
necessity are not two different things. The implied term 
of contract itself is based on the existence of proved 
necessity. If there is no other alternative to a workman 
to reach the workplace except the one provided by the em-
ployer then it is implied in his terms of contract that 
he will be deemed on duty from the very begining when he 
starts through that particular way provided by the employer 
and not from the moment when he actually reaches the work 
spot. It is a proved necessity that, in order to start the 
3. vardaraj lu Na^,^^ v. M. Bovan (1954)II LL.J. 426 
m 
work he must reach the workplace, through that parti-
cular way. If he received any injury by an accident , 
while in that particular way, the accident falls in 
the course of employment. 
B- COMMENCEM£I>iT OF Tll£ tIMPIOYMENT; 
4 
In Saurasthra Salt Mfg, Co. their Lordships 
while pronouncing the principle of notional extension 
concluded the judgment by laying down: 
"It is well settled that when a workman is on a 
public road or a public place or on a public transport 
he is there as einy other member of the public and is not 
tiiere in the course of his employment unless the very 
nature of his employment makes it necessary for him to be 
there. A workman is not in the course of his employment 
from the moment he leaves his home and is on his way to 
his work. He certainly is in course of his employment 
if he reaches the place of work or a point or an area 
which comes within the theory of notional extension, 
outside of which the employer is not liable to pay com-
pensation for any accident happening to him." 
Same are the decisions of the English Courts to 
5 
this effect. Lord Atkinson in John Stewart & Son observedJ 
4 . Supra n o t e , 2 
5 , John S t e w a r t & Son, (1912) Ltd . v . Longhxurst, (1917) 
A . C . 2 4 9 . 
10' 
"When a man walks along the public streets 
to get to his work he is doing some thing 
which he has perfect right to do irres-
pective altogether of his employment. The 
right does not spring from his employment 
at all. It belongs to him as a member of 
the piiblic". 
6 
In Northumbrian Shipping Co.Ltd. - Lord Macmillan observed: 
"In the case of a town house in a street it would 
doubtless be necessary to draw the line between the public 
highway and the master's house with just the same precision 
as the line is drawn between the public harbour and the 
ship. If the maid-servant fell on the pavement a few feet away 
she would presumably be outside the MCt, alvjays of course 
assuming that she was not on some errand for her master at 
the time". 
In applying the principle as laid down by Supreme 
7 
Court in Saurashtra Salt Mfg. Co. / Lahiri C.J. of Calcutta 
8 
High Court in Commissioners for the port of Calcutta 
observed! 
"The limits of the doctrine of notional extension 
of the place of employment nave been pointed out in that 
case as well as trie different English cases of the English 
Courts, according to which the notional extension terminates 
when a workman has reached a public place where the members 
of the public have a right to exercise whatever rights they 
have". 
6. Northumbrain Shipping Co.Ltd.v.McCullum, (1932)25 B.W.C.C. 
284« P. 301 
7 . Supra note 1 
8 . Supra note 2 
lo ; . 
The facts of the case were that the deceased 
was a clerk in the office of the appellant and his duty-
was to prepare accounts and records of the export and 
import Cargo. He was going to Join his duties on a bi-
cycle and route lay through a main street of Calcutta, 
portions of which were under the control of the appellant 
and where he received injuries. The contention that the 
case came within the exception recognised in the Supreme 
Court decision was repelled by both the Judges who cons-
tituted the Bench and Lahiri C.J,, said: "In order to 
come within the theory of notional extension, the place 
of accident must be one at which the workman could not 
be present except by virtue of his employment. This fea-
ture is completely absent in the present case". 
9 
In Northumbrian shipping Co. Lord Macmillan observed; 
"If in going to or coming from his work he has to 
use an access which is part of his employer's premises or 
which he is only entitled to traverse because he is going 
to or coining from his work, he is held to be on his master's 
business while he is using that access". 
The facts of the case were that the seaman who, on 
his way back to his ship, has left the public highway with 
its risks common to all way tarers and has entered the 
9. Supra note 6 
10b 
private premises of the harbours in which his ship lies 
with its special risks to which only those who have 
business at the harbour are exposed, sustains injuries 
using this access which he would not have encountered 
but for his employment. 
10 
In Howell's Case where John Howells* generally 
used to take along with the other labourers# as a matter 
oi routine while going to his steamer to load cargo# a 
short-cut which involved the crossing of some railway lines* 
in preference to another route provided by the employers. 
One day he was knocked down and killed by a railway enjine 
while going across. The Court of appeal held that the 
workman was in the employer's premises and was proceeding 
to work over an accustomed and permitted, though not pro-
vided route, the accident must be considered to have arisen 
out of and in the course of employment, 
11 
Misra J.in Works Manager is reported to have said: 
"-.... it'would appear to be a legitimate corollar/ that 
what may be called environmental accidents,that is accidents 
resulting from the surroundings in which the workman is 
employed or through which he has to reach his place of work 
in order to carry out his obligations to his employer,may 
fall within the scope of the phrase 'arising out of and in 
10. Howells V. Great Western Railway (1928) 97 L.J.K.B.183 
11. Works Manager,Carriage &< Wagon Shop, E.I.Railway v, 
Wahabir, A.I.R. 1954 A-11-. 132 
l u ; 
the course of his employment". In this case the workman 
was going to fulfill the emergency call besides his 
normal hours of work and receives injuries in the street 
by acciaent, it was held tliat tiie accident arose out of 
and in the course of his employment, haviny regard to 
the fact that there was evidence to support the conclu-
sion that the appellant was on duty at the time of 
accident. 
1. TRAVEL BY TRANSPORT PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYER^t 
If a workman, in order to reach the place of 
his employment, travels by means of transport provided 
by the employer, and there is no other means by which 
he can reach there, it has been held that he is in the 
12 
course of his employment since he enters the transport. 
13 
Lord Atkinson in Hewitson's case formulated 
the test to be applied in such situations as follows: 
"A workman is acting in the course of his em-
ployment when he is doing something in discharge of a 
duty to his employer, directly or indirectly imposed upon 
him by his contract of service," and held that the work-
men in travelling to or from the colliery in the trains 
were not discharging any duty to their employer which 
tJjeir contract of service bound them to discharge. In his 
12. Supra note 3 
13. St. Hellns Colliery Co.Ltd. v. Hewitson, 1924,A.c.59 
lus 
Lordship's words: " the evidence in this case does not 
establish that the colliery compdny was bound to provide 
these trains to their workmen to carry them to their work 
in the colliery. Nor that the workmen were on their side 
bound to travel to their work by those trains; nor yet 
that there were no other means reasonably available by 
wnich they could travel to their work. "His Lordship fur-
Uier saidj "If each collier was bound by his contract to 
travel to his employer's colliery by this provided train, 
then cadit quaestio« the collier would be in the course of 
his employment. But conferring upon a collier of a pri-
vilege whicn he is free to avail himself of or not/ would 
prima facie, impose no duty wiiatever upon him to use it. " 
M3 in some special circumstances such an obliga-
tion might be implied. His Lordship, further laid down: "It 
must, however, be borne in mind that if the physical fea-
tures of the locality be such that the means of transit 
offered by the employer are the only means of transit avai-
lable to transport the workman to his work, there may, in 
the workman's contract of service, be implied a term that 
there was an obligation on the employer to provide such 
means and a reciprocal obligation on the workman to avail 
himself of them". The test of Hewitson was again considered 
14 
by the House of Lords in Newton case. In this case a 
14. Newton V. Guest Keen & Nettlefolds Ltd.Cl926) ,.135 LTR 1986 
1 fj \i 
c o l l i e r y labourer was employed by the respondents a t 
t h e i r c o l l i e r y . He l i ved t h r ee - and -a -qua r t e r mi les 
from, the c o l l i e r y , which was on a high h i l l . The r e s -
pondents , to en€±>le the workmen t o form a s h i f t as e a r l y 
as 7.00 a.m. provided t r a i n s by which the miners could 
t r a v e l to the c o l l i e r y . These t r a i n s were run by a r a i l -
way company, under an agreement. The c o l l i e r y agent in 
evidence sa id t h a t the men were expected to t r a v e l by these 
t r a i n s . On an October morning the workman, while c ros s ing 
the l i n e s to j o i n one of these t r a i n s to t r a v e l to the 
c o l l i e r y , was knocked down by a l i g h t - e n g i n e , and, as a 
r e s u l t of the i n ju ry ,h i s leftJeg nad to be amputated. The 
house of Lords, held t h a t there was no evidence on which 
i t could be found t h a t i t was p a r t of the workman's duty 
to use the t r a i n whenever he went to and irom the mines, 
and t h e r e f o r e , i t formed no p a r t of h i s c o n t r a c t of em-
ployment. The acc iden t consequently did not a r i s e in the 
course of h i s eniployment. 
In applying the law as l a i d down by the House of 
Lords in the above two c a s e s , a Division Bench of the 
Court c o n s i s t i n g of Rajamanner, C . J . , and Umamahaswarn,J. 
15 
in Vandarajulu Naidu c a s e , held t h a t the case in hand 
came wi th in tne except ion noted in Hewitson case and i t 
i s l a i d down J "The Commissioner fotuid t h a t not only was 
15. iiupra no te , 3 
l l f . 
the lorry provided by the employer the most reasonable 
and feasible means of transport but also that there was 
no other means of a conveyance to and from the workspot 
being a hilly track. When there are other alternative 
means open to the workmen to reach the place of their 
employment then they are not in the course of their em-
ployment while in the way to their place of employment. 
The same rules will apply to the problems of commencement 
16 
of employment after an interruption in it. 
In the cases of injury to workmen, employed to 
work on ships, it has been generally held that if injury 
occurs to them while going from quay to the ship by special 
means provided by the employer, the injury is in the course 
17 
of employment. In Moore case , the only means to go from 
the quay to the ship was through a ladder. A seamon who 
had gone ashore with leave to buy some necessaries for 
himself was returning to the ship through the ladder which 
was not very firmly fixed. He fell into water and was 
drowned. The House of Lords held that at the time of the 
accident he was in the course of his employment. 
16. Mlderman v. G.W.K. C o . . (1937) 2 /^^ll E.R. 408 
17 . Moore v , Manches te r L i n e r s L t d . , (1910) A . C . 498 
l i 
2. A REASONABLE TIME BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF ACTUAL WORK; 
tx workman, who reaches toe place of his work before 
time, is in the course of his employment if the period by 
which he reaches earlier than the actual time of commence-
ment of his work is not unreasonable. His employment is 
deemed to have commenced from the moment he reaches the 
place of his employment. 
18 In Sharp case a workman, who was employed at cartford, had 
to travel from London each day by a train v^ich arrived at 
Cartford station at 5,45 a.m. It normally took twenty 
minutes to reach the work spot from the station. The work 
did not commence before 6,30 a.m. but there was a canteen 
and an office near the work spot where the workman was given 
the metal discs with which he could clock on, and this he 
could take at any time before 6,30 a.m, while doing this 
( at about 6.30 a.m, ) he was injured by accidentally falling 
into an excavation. It was held that his employment had 
already commenced at that time and he was in the course of 
his employment. 
19 
In Smt Sheela case the deceased husband of the appellant 
left his house at about 8.30 a.m. to Join his duty at 9,00 
a.m. He used to by local bus service. At about 9.30 a.m. 
a stranger came to the residence of the appellant and 
18. Sharp v. Johnson U Co. Ltd. (1905) 2 K.D. 139 
19. Smt. Sheela v. The Regional Director E.a.I. Corporation 
6c Others, (1990) LUIC l6Bf> fp>^ m 
lie 
Informed her that the person who was carrying the card 
issued by £,o.I, Department had expired at local bus 
stand. She claimed benefits payable to her under the 
E.O.I, Hct but was denied. It was held by the High 
Court that "only the bus and few minutes in the bus, 
stands between the workman and the factory. The notional 
extension is permissible keeping in view the social wel-
fare nature of the legislation and thus the injury occured 
in the course of the employment," 
C- TERInlN^TIOK OF EMPLQYMEl^T: 
Normally the employment of a workman comes to an 
end when he leaves the place of employment. In Foulton 
20 
case / a workman was injured while passing through a 
market on his way home from work. The Court of Appeal 
held that the injury did not occur in the course of his 
employment and observed: "It is perfectly well established 
that a man is not within the protection of the Act when 
he is guing from his master's place from Uie factory or 
whatever it may be- to his home", 
21 
In Hewitson , the workman who was 'injured in a railway 
accident while travelling in a special collier's train 
from his work to his home, was held not in the course of 
his employment, because at the time of the accident he 
To". i^ Pulton v, Kelsall (1912) 2 K. B. 131 
21. oupra note 13 
l i : > 
had left the place of his work. In other wordS/ his 
employment had come to an end. The rationale of this 
decision of the House of Lords is that when a person 
leaves the place of his employment he is no more under 
any obligation to obey the orders of his employer or 
to do any duty to him. 
However, this normal rule is subject to the theory 
of notional extension. But, the extent to which this 
theory of notional extension would apply to the cases of 
termination of employment is a doubtful proposition. 
22 
Collins,M,K, in Smith case observed, " Whilst the workman 
is physically engaged in making his exit from the place 
where he is employed, I think the employment would still 
continue for the purposes of the /tct, and the workman 
would still be entitled to the protection thereby given.,, 
but there must come a time ,., when he can no longer be 
said to be engaged in the employment. It appears to me 
to be a question of fact where the line is to be drawn." 
To determine this question of fact it seems necessary to ask 
a question was the presence of the workman in the place 
in question and at the time in question is in pursuance 
of or in.accordance with-some expressed or implied-
term of his contract of service ? If t^ e^ 
22. :jmith v. Normanton Colliery Co,, (1903) 1. K,B. 204 
lit 
answer can be given in the affirmative/ the employment 
will extend to that time and place; otherwise it will 
not. So long as the workman is lawfully upon premises 
under the control of his employers so that a duty 
exists in respect thereof from them to him /his employ-
ment will continue. It can not be assumed, however, 
that the Act extends to workmen on any part of the em-
ployer's property. Thus in Caton case workman was 
held not in the course of employment where he, having 
finished his day's work, was walking home along a 
private branch of railway in the occupation of his 
employers, leading from their colliery to the main line 
of a railway company, and was knocked down by an engine 
of his employers 230 y«u:ds from the )place where he had 
24 
been working. However, in M'Kee ,workman was held 
in the course of employment, when a workman was killed 
on h i s e m p l o y e r ' s p r e m i s e s w h i l s t l e a v i n g them by s h o r t 
c u t which he had n e v e r used b e f o r e , b u t which otiiermen 
25 
were i n t h e h a b i t of u s i n g . In i^leaver c a s e , a n i n j u r y 
t o a workman, which occu red w h i l e l e a v i n g t h e p l a c e of 
h i s work, was h e l d t o be i n t h e c o u r s e of h i s employment 
on t h e ground t h a t a t t h e t ime of t h e a c c i d e n t h i s 
2 3 . Catoii V. Summelee & Hossend I r o n Co. L t d . , (190 2) 
39 o .L.R. 762 
24 . M'kee v. G r e a t Nor the rn Rai lway Co. (1908) ,1 B.W.C.C. 
2 5 . Weaver v, T r e d e g a r I r o n 6c Coal Co. Ltd. 1940-) ^ 
3 M i l . L.R. 157. 
ll. 'l 
"duty to leave the employment in a permitted manner had 
not been completed." The workinan was permitted to leave 
the premises by a train and the workman, at the time of 
his injury, was trying to Board the train. 
The difficulty generally arises when the injury 
occurs to a workman after he has left the place of his 
em-ployraent and is on the way to his residence. If he is 
going by the transport of his own choice or on foot, he is 
not in the course of his employment but if he is going 
by a transport provided by his employer tiie answer would 
depend upon the fact whether transport provided by the 
employer is the only means available or other alternative 
means are also open to the workman, 
1. TRAVEL BY TR^>iSFORT PROVIDED BY TtiE EHPLQYEK ; 
(a) ^HEti THERE IS NO ALTERN/VriVE ; 
When the transport provided by the employer is 
the only means of going home from the place of work and 
there is no other alternative means of transport, a workman, 
who goes by that transport is in the course of his employ-
ment till ne reaches hon^. 
26 
In Richaidcase / a workman was employed on an 
island as a farm Icujourer on yearly wages and boarding and 
lodging. He was also entitled to come to his home on the 
main land to see his wife frdm time to time. The only 
means of transport from the island to the mainland was 
26. Richards v. iMorris 11915) l K.B. 221 
lif. 
the employer's boat. While crossing the channel in 
that boat from island to the mainland he was injured 
against the gunwale of the boat, as a result of which 
he ultimately died. The court of appeal held that at 
the time of the injury he was in tne course of his em-
ployment. This is a clear case of proved necessity on 
the basis of which the Court held that it was part of the 
contract between the deceased and his employer that rea-
sonable facilities should be given to him to go shore 
to visit his wife, and the only means of doing so were 
by his employer's boat. 
27 
In V a y d a r a j u l u N a i d u ' s c a s e a l s o t h e Commiss ioner found 
t h a t n o t o n l y was t h e l o r r y p r o v i d e d b y t h e employer the 
m o s t r e a s o n a b l e and f e a s i b l e means o f t r a n s p o r t b u t a l s o 
t h a t t h e r e was no o t h e r means o f c o n v e y a n c e t o and from 
t h e workspot b e i n g a h i l l y t r a c k . 
(b) WHEN OTHER ALT£raNiAIIV£c> ^<£ /^ LSQ AVAILABLE; 
Where b e s i d e s t h e t r a n s p o r t p r o v i d e d by t h e employer 
o t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e means o f t r a n s p o r t a r e a l s o a v a i l a b l e t o 
a workman and n e i t h e r he i s boxind#nor i s t h e r e any n e c e s s i t y , 
t o t r a v e l b y t h e t r a n s p o r t p r o v i d e d b y t h e employer and 
s t i l l he t r a v e l s by i t t h e n , w h i l e t r a v e l l i n g through t h a t 
t r a n s p o r t from t h e p l a c e o f h i s work t o h i s home,he i s n o t 
i n t h e c o u r s e o f h i s employment . The c o u r s e of h i s e m p l o y -
ment c e a s e s a s soon a s he l e a v e s t h e place> o f h i s work, 
2 7 . Supra n o t e 3 
ir. 
There is no controversy so far as its application to 
particular circumstances are concerned. 
It has been generally assumed that the decision 
28 
of the House of Lords in Hewitson has finally decided 
the test to be applied in cases where the workman sustains 
an accident in coming to or leaving the place of his em-
ployment. In that case, a workman employed at a colliery 
was injured in a railway accident while travelling in a 
special colliers train from his work to his home. By an 
agreement between the colliery company and the railway 
company, the latter agreed to provide a special train for 
the conveyance of the colliery workmen to an from the 
colliery and the place of the residence of the workmen, 
x'ne colliery company provided each workmen who intended to 
use the train with a pass and charged him with a sum 
representing less than the full amount of the agreed fare, 
and this sum was deducted from weekly wages. All the 
workmen did not travel by these trains/ some walked and 
some went by omnibus. It was held by the House of Lords 
that there being no obligation on the workmen, to use the 
train, the injury did not arise in the course of employmej^t", 
Supreme Court of India while accepting the prin-
ciple laid down for the application of the doctrine of 
notional extension in Hewitson has further extended its 
28, Supra note 13 
l is 
scope in the land mark decision of B.E.s.T. Undertaking 
29 
case / where the widow of one of the drivers claimed 
compensation for the fatal accident of her husband. The 
deceased was one of the drivers employed by the Bombay 
Municipal Corporation, One day after finishing his work 
and leaving the bus at the Jogeshwari bus depot, the 
deceased boarded another bus in order to go to his resi-
dence at 3anta Cruz. On the way the bus collided with a 
stationary lorry parked at an awkward angle, as a result 
the deceased was thrown out on the road and got injured. 
He was removed to hospital for treatment where he succumbed 
to his injuries on July 26, 1957, The :iupreme Court con-
firmed the decision of the High Court in granting compen-
sation and held that the accident was in the course of 
employment even though other alternative means were also 
available to the deceased. Mr. Justice Subba Rao C as 
he then was) delivering the majority Judgment laid down 
the following principle; 
"The cjuestion when does an employment begin and 
when does it cease, depends upon tiie facts o£ each case. 
But the courts have agreed that the employment does not 
necessarily and when the 'down tool' signal is given or 
when the workman leaves the actual workshop where he is 
working. There is a notional extension as both the entry 
2 9. General Manager, B.E.S.T. Undertaking v. ilrs. .^ qens/d 9fi-^) 
II LL.J. 615 
11:1 
cind exit by time and space. The scope of such extension 
must necessarily depend on tlie circumstances of a given a 
case. ivn employment may end or may begin not only when 
the employee begins to work or leave his tools but also 
when he used the means of access and agress to and from 
the place of employment. A theoritical option to take an 
alternative route may not detract from such duty if the 
accepted one is of proved necessity or of practical compulsion. 
I'he Court observed that tlic premises of a factory 
which gives ingress and egress to the work place is a limited 
one, but in case of a city transport service, the entire 
fleet of buses forming the service would be the premises, 
tree transport is provided in the interest of service and to 
maintain its efficiency, having regard to the long distance, 
a driver has to go to depot from his house and vice versa. 
The use of the said buses, is a proved necessity giving rise 
to an obligation on his part to travel in the said buses as a 
part of his duty. He is not exercising the right as a 
member of the public, but only as one belonging to the 
service. Therefore if a driver uses the bus in going to 
and coming from the depot, any accident that happens to him 
is an accident in the course of his employment. The Court 
added, the doctrine of notional extension of employment, 
developed in the context of si>ecific workshops, factories 
or harbours equally applies to such a bus service. The 
doctrine necessarily will have to be adopted to meet the 
peculiar requirements , inspite of the fact that the 
Kli 
workman c o n c e r n e d h a s d i s c h a r g e d h i s d u t i e s and l e f t 
t h e p r e c i n c t s of t h e d e p o t , a f t e r t h e t o o l down h o u r s . 
Hence where a workman me t witJi an a c c i d e n t i n t h e 
t r a n s p o r t of h i s e m p l o y e r , he i s e n t i t l e d t o c o m p e n s a t i o n , 
2» , KLrioQNMBLE TIME ^iFTEK TiliJ /tCl'lI/^L TUOLo LKJWN : 
As t h e e m p l o y m e n t b e g i n s a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e b e f o r e 
t h e a c t u a l commencement of t h e work , so i n t h e c a s e of 
t e r m i n a t i o n of e m p l o y m e n t i t c o n t i n u e s f o r a r e a s o n a b l e 
t i m e e v e n a f t e r t h e a c t u a l ' t o o l s d o w n ' . I t i s n e i t h e r 
e x p e c t e d from a workman, n o r i s i t p r a c t i c a l l y p o s s i b l e 
for him to leave the employer's premises or place of 
work simultaneously with the cessation of the work. 
burln'^ - that period he remains in the course of his em-
ployment on the basis of proved necessity. In John Stewart 
20 
and Son case, a carpenter was employed by John Stewart U 
Son, Limited, to repair a barge lying in a dock con-
trolled by the Port of London authority. The uock was 
not open to the public but the carpenter and his employer 
had authority to pass through the docks on their way to 
and from the barge, une night the carpenter while re-
turning from the barge after finishing the work of the 
day fell off the quay in the darkness of the night and 
was drowned. On appeal, the House of Lords reversing 
the decision of the country court held tliat for the 
30. Supra note, 5 
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purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Act tlie employ-
ment may be regarded as existing before the actual 
operations of the workman had begun and may continue 
even after the actual work has ceased. 
In the light of the above discussion it is 
submitted that the doctrine of notional extension of 
the ^temployer's premises is a doctrine which extends the 
coverage of the accidents caused to the workman while 
they are on the way to or fron) the place of their work 
or place of employment wnere they are to perform their 
duties. According to this doctrine the employer's pre-
mises includes an area which the workman passes and re-
passes in going to and in leaving the actual place of 
his work. In order to apply this theory of notional 
extension the workman is to ^ rove that he was at place 
of accident because of terms of contract of service either 
expressly contained therein or by implication. For example 
if the workman is under duty to use tne means of conve-
yance provided by the employer in order to reach his 
place of v.orK and to reach his hcrnie after finishing his 
work expressly under a term contained in Uie contract 
of service, he will be entitled to compensation if per-
sonal injury is sustained by him by accident while he 
is using tiiat means of conveyance. This doctrine is 
intexided to give benefit of compensation to the 
workmen for injuries caused by accidents when tney are 
1 \''' 
i. u ^ 
not at the place of their actual WOLk but are actually 
going or coming i.rom their place of work. It extends 
the area of coverage of accidents which otherwise are 
not covered in expression 'accidents arising out of 
and in the course of employment*. 
* C h a p t e r - V * 
* AMOUNT OF COMPEHSATION AND * 
^ PUNISHMENT FOK DEFAULT * 
k 
k 
k 
* 
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*\I-10UNT or COMPENSATION AND PUNISHMENT FOR DEFAULT 
/^ fter fixing the liability of the employer for compen-
sation the next question to be dealt with is the extent of 
employer's liability or the amount to be paid by the employer 
as compensation to the workman, section 4 of the Act deals 
with the quantum of compensation payable to a workman or to 
the heirs of the deceased workman according to the nature of 
the injury. The amount of compensation so determined is made 
subject to other provisions of the Act. 
Hazardous nature of the employment as specified in 
Schedule II of the Act ia now the sole deciding factor in 
determining the liability of the employers. Earlier the 
liability of the employers ( in case of railways ) was con-
2 
fined to certain categories oi railway servants without any 
wage limit and in all cases generally it was confined to per-
sons who were employed in any one of the hazardous employ-
ments specified in schedule II of the Act provided their 
monthly wages do not exceed Rs. 1000/- per month. Thus apart 
from hazardous nature of the employment the wage limit was 
1. workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 
2. All Railway servants as defined in section 3 of the 
Indian Railways Act 1890 except those who are permanently 
employed in any administrative district or sub-divisional 
office of a Railway. 
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the deciding factor in determining the liability of the 
employer. It means an employer was not liable to pay 
compensation to persons drawing more than iw. 1,000/- per 
month even though such persons are engaged in any one of 
the hazardous employment specified in schedule II of the 
3 
rtct and equally facing the risk just as otiier persons draw-
ing less than Ri. 1,000/- per month. It was felt unfair 
and illogical to discri.ninate persons facinj equal risk by 
taking the wage factor into consideration. national Com-
4 5 
mission on Labour, 1969 and the Law Conunission of India 
urged for the removal of the wage limit. /\t last under tlie 
iy84 amendments the wage limit for the coverage of tne /ict 
6 
was removed altogether. This has been done by omitting 
tile words ' on monthly wages not exceeding one thousand 
rupees* in sub-clause (ii) of clause (n) in sub-section(1) 
of section 2 of the Act. The effect of the 19G4 amendment 
is that hereafter the hazardous nature of the employment 
and not the wage limit therefrom will be the deciding factor 
in placing a person in the ucfinition of workman under 
6a 
the Workmen's Compensation /vet, 1923. The eimendment has 
s u b s t a n t i a l l y increased the l i a b i l i t y of the employer and 
bene f i t ed a la rge number of workman who were not covered 
p r e v i o u s l y under the Act. Hov;ever, the newly i n s e r t e d ex-
p l ana t i on I I of sec t ion 4(1) lb) s ays : 
3. oupra note 1, Schedule 11 
4. para 13.22 of the rleport 
b. 62n(i Report, October, 1974 
6. Workmen's Compensation w^mendment) / ict , 1904 
6a, Chabra,H.R,: "Changes in the •-Vorkmen's Compensation Act, 
1923- wider Coverage U Higher compensation",261 L J , jan-June, 1984. 
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"Where the monthly wages of a workman exceed 
one thousand rupees his monthly wages for purposes of 
clause Ca) and (b) shall be deemed to be one thousand 
only". It means, while calculating the amount for pay-
ment of compensation in case of death or disablement the 
pay ceiling is deemed to be ic.. 1,000/- per montJi, It has 
been stated by then Union Labour Minister bhri Veerendra 
patil/ in the course of parliamentary debates, that the 
reuson for this is to ensure that uinount of compensation 
payable under the ^ct does not became unduly large, which 
the employers, particularly the smaller one, way find it 
difficult to pay since under 1984 amendments { then pro-
posed) the financial liability of employers has been 
7 
increased sxibstantially, 
,w PRINCIPLE FUR AWARDING GQHI EN^^/XTIUNI ; 
The principle on which compensation is to be 
awarded has to be determined in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Act, and can not be departed from on ground 
of sentiments. It is impossible for a court applying the 
law to go beyond the rules laid down for awarding cotnpen-
8 
sation. In «3<»g|><ith Brijraj Oil Mill , the Allahabad High 
Court held that it is not open to the commissioner to award 
any damages or compensation except that provided by the Act, 
7, Statement ot Objects & reasons for the amendment of 
Workmen's Co.-.ipensation /^ ct "Lok-Sabha Debates" 2nd May, 
1984, P. 347 
8, Jagnath brilraj Oil Mill v, Soember, MIH , l^ j3y vill. 29 
128 
'J 
In Chnatiya Devi v. Rupal - I t was observed 
t h a t the amount of compensation al lowable under the Act 
in case of death of workman resul t inc j trom an in ju ry 
during the course of employment has been fixed by the 
s t a t u t e i t s e l f . There i s no opt ion to the commissioner 
but to allow compensation fixed by the s t a t u t e once he 
ho lds t h a t the h e i r s of employee were e n t i t l e d t o claim 
the same. Even i f the h e i r s of the dfjcoasod workman 
claim l e s s compensation tlian the p r e sc r ibed under Sche-
dule IV read with sec t ion 4(1) (a) the coirimissioner should 
gran t the compensation as provided by tJie s t a t u t e . In 
10 
ilandulova Jatyanarayana^ tlie d r i v e r and the c l eane r sus-
t a ined bodi ly i n j u r i e s in an acc iden t and died. The 
in3urance company had covered the l i a b i l i t y in r e s p e c t 
of death of d r i ve r and c leaner t o the ex ten t of 1^.50,000/-
I t has been held by the High Court of ^vndhra Pradesh 
t h a t the p rov i s ions contained in sec t ion 110A(i of the 
iiotor Vehicles /tct, I'^f^^ are b e n e f i c i a l and intended to 
enable the workmen or txie l ega l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of tiie 
deceased workmen to claim higher compensation i f the 
same can be awarded eitl^ier under, .the Motor Vehicles ^^ct 
or under the Workmen's Compensation / \ct . 
y. Chhatiya Devi v. Kupal, 1976 UtI .C. 1368, 1369 (Pat) . 
10. Mandulova Satyanarayana v.B.Lokeswari & Others/ 
AIR 1991 A.P. 323 
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B - BASIC PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ASSESSMEMT OF GOMPENSATIQN-
A f t e r t h e 1984 amendments t h e p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n -
i n g t h e a s s e s s m e n t o f c o m p e n s a t i o n h a s a l s o gone a s i g -
n i f i c a n t c h a n g e . To u n d e r s t a n d t h e c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n we 
h a v e t o l o o k i n t o t h e p o s i t i o n s b e f o r e 1984 amendments 
a n d a f t e r t h a t . 
1 . PQSITIOH PrllOR TO 1 9 3 4 ; 
B e f o r e t h e 1984 a m e n d m e n t s , t l i e f o l l o w i n g f a c t o r s 
were t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t i n t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o m p e n s a t i o n , 
(a) M o n t h l y iVages : - Gcxnpensa t ion u n d e r t h e Workmen 's 
C o m p e n s a t i o n /vct was u e t e t m i n e a d c c o r d i i i y t o Llie moriLhly 
wage g r o u p t o v/hich t h e c o n c e r n e d workman b e l o n g s . T h e r e -
f o r e i t was e s s e n t i a l t o c a l c u l a t e t h e m o n t h l y wages of 
a workman i r r e s p e c t i v e of v. 'hether wages a r e i n a c t u a l 
p r a c t i c e p a i d b y d a y , week o r a n y o t h e r p e r i o d , S e c t i o n 
5 (a) of t t i e rtCt s t a t e s t h a t i n c a s e of workjnan h a v i n g one 
y e a r c o n t i n u o u s s e r v i c e , m o n t h l y wages a r e one t w e l f t h 
of t h e wages f a l l e n due f o r p a y m e n t i n t h e p r e c e d i n g one 
y e a r . C o n t i n u o u s s e r v i c e i n c l u d e s a p e r i o d of a b s e n c e 
f rom d u t y which d o e s n o t e x c e e d 14 d a y s . I n c a s e s of 
workmen n o t h a v i n g e v e n one month s e r v i c e m o n t h l y wages 
a r e d e t e r m i n e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e wages p a y a b l e t o a 
workman e m p l o y e d on t l i e sajne w o r k . I n o t h e r c a s e s m o n t h l y 
w a g e s s h a l l be t h i r t y t i m e s t i i e t o t a l wages e a r n e d i n 
1^8 
the last continuous period ol service divided by the 
number of days comprising such period. Compensation was 
payable to persons drawing monthly wages not exceeding 
Rs. 1,000/- per month. 
(Ja; Type of Injury : Compensation is given to the workman 
who suffered an Injury which arose out of and in the course 
of employment. The amount of compensation varies in 
cases of death, permanent total disablement, permanent 
partial disablement and temporary disablement whether 
total or partial. O^ese Injuries will be discussed in 
detail latter on. 
2. POSITION AFTER 1984 AM£I>;DM£NT /iND THEIR IMPLICATIONS; 
The 1984 amendments have materially altered the 
basic principles of assessment of compensation. As it is 
discussed above, prior to the 1984 amendments while cal-
culating the amount of compensation only the wage factor 
but not the age factor was taken into account. This was 
considered unfair to those who happened to get disabled 
or die at an early age as compared to persons who are at 
10a 
the apex of retirement age. Therefore under the 1984 
amendments provisions has been made for payment of compen-
sation in terms of percentage of monthly wages multiplied 
by relevant factor linked to the age of the workman at the 
time of his disablement or death. For this purpose, the 
10a.Rayalu,v. J.S.;"Extent of Liability and Principles ^ eter-
mining Compensation under Wibrkmen's Compensation Act, 1923-
A Critical Survey with Special Reference to the 1984 
aniencJnents", S C J, Jan-Feb, 1989 
12:, 
wholly amended Schedule-Iv contains now only contains 
two columns. The first column specifies the completed 
years of age or the last birthday of the workman imme-
diately preceding the date on which the compensation fell 
due. The second column contains the relevant factor 
against each entry in the first column. 
For e.gr- For entry 16 ( age of tiio workman) in 
the first column the relevant factor would be 228.54 in 
the second column. 
C- QUANTUM OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE SCHEME i 
/\fter calculating the above factors the quantum 
of compensation is determined by making a reference to 
Section 4 and Schedule IV of tiie /ict. For the purposes 
of payment of compensation tne injury has been divided 
into four categories; namely: 
1 - Compensation in case of death, 
2 - Compensation in case of permanent total 
disablement 
3 - Compensation in case of permanent partial 
disablement. 
4.- Condensation in case of temporary disablement 
whether total or partial, 
1, COMPENSATION FOR DEATHt 
Death has been nowhere defined under the Act 
since it is obvious and does not require any definition. 
130 
If the injury from the accident result in the death of 
a workman tne compensation is payable by the employer 
to the dependents of the workman . In such cases the 
amount of compensation is determined by making a refe-
rence to schedule IV. Prior to amendment of section 4 
in 19a4 the amount ot compensatic^n for the death of the 
workman caused by the accident was . d«tennined by the 
monthly wage group to which a workman belonged with refe-
rence to column 2 of schedule iv. The maximum amount 
payable in case of death to the dependents of a worker 
was Rs. 30/000 minimum fixed at Rs. 7,200. The amount, is 
payable in.lump sum in such cases. 
11 
In New India /assurance Company Ltd. case 
The Karnataka High Court held that according 
to the evidence on record it was proved that the deaeased 
workman was getting Rs, 300 p.m. Under schedule iv of the 
Act for the death of the workman getting wages between 
Rs. 200 to Rs. 300 the quantum prescribed being Rs. 18#000/ 
the tribunal ought to have fixed the liability of insurance 
m 
company under section 110-B of Motor Vehicle Act at Rs. 18,000 
the accident Glaims Tribunal was therefore, wrong in 
awarding compensation of Rs. 34,000 to the claimant and 
11. New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Smt.Meenaxi and 
Others^ AIR 1981 ( Kant.) 68 
13 
fixing liability joint and severally on all respondents 
Including insiirance company. 
After 1984 Amendment of section 4 far reaching 
changes have been affected. Now where the death results 
from accident or injxiry the amount of compensation shall 
be an amount equal to 40% of the monthly wages of the 
deceased workman multiplied by the relevant factor speci-
fied in the second column of the substituted schedule IV 
or an amount of twenty thousand rupees^ whichever is more. 
But relevant factor will be chosen with reference to the 
first column of schedule IV where completed years of age 
of the workman is given. Minimum compensation fixed at 
12 
Ri. 20*000, the maximum will be taken by the dependents 
of the yoxingest deceased. Thus the amount of compensation 
under the new system is more for those persons who die at 
an early age and comparatively less for those who die at 
the age of retirement. However in case of persons drawing 
less than Rs. 220 p.m. the age factor has no significance. 
2. COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL. DISABLEMENT ; 
In case of injuries not resulting in death, the 
amount of compensation depends upon the nature of the dis-
ablement, that is whether the disablement is total or par-
tial, temporary or permanent. When a workman incapacitated 
from doing any work %«hich he was capable of performing at 
12. section 4 (1) (aj 
13 
the time of accident resulting In such disablement 
It Is total disablement. If the Incapacity is permanent 
13 
in nature, it Is permanent total disablement. Further/ 
permanent total disablement shall be deemed to result 
from every Injury specified in Part-I of schedule I 
since the loss of earning capacity as specified against 
such injuries is 100/« or more. It may also result from 
any combination of Injuries in part~II of Schedule I, 
where the aggregate percentage of the loss of earning 
capacity as specified against such Injuries amount to 
100/4 or more. 
Prior to the amendment of section 4(1) (b) in 
1984 the amount of compensation payable in case of per-
manent total disablement depends upon the wage group to 
which the workmen concerned belongs and column 2 of 
schedule IV of the Act specifies the amount of compen-
sation payable for different wage groups. 
But the amended section 4(1)(2) provides that 
where permanent total disablement results from the injury 
the amount of compensation shall be equal to fifty per 
cent of the monthly wages of the Injured workman multiplie< 
by the relevant factor or an amount of Rs. 24/000/ which-
ever is more. Thus apart from maximum amount of compensa-
tion which can be claimed by a workman of 16 years age a 
minimum amount of compensation has also been fixed. 
13. Section 2(1) 
13a 
The relevant factor can>be ascertained from the column II 
<jf schedule IV with reference to age of the injured 
workman. . Here also if the monthly wages exceeds Rs. 1000 
then for the piorpose of this clause the monthly shall be 
deemed to be Rs. 1/000 only. 
14 
In Pratap Narain Singh Deo - where a carpenter 
suffered injury in the course of employment which resulted 
in amputation of left hand above elbow. Since carpenter 
can not work with one hand« disablement was held to be 
total and loss of earning capacity was 100/i. So he was 
entitled to compensation on the basis of total disablement, 
3- COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABLEMENT: 
If the injury reduces the earning capacity of the 
workman in respect of each and every employment which he 
was capable of undertaking at the time of the accident it 
is permanent partial disablement. Further it is also pro-
vided that every injury specified in part-II of schedule I 
15 
shall be deemed to result in permanent partial disablement. 
In case of non-schedule injuries the loss or reduction in 
the earning capacity would be assessed by a qualified medical 
practioner, 
14. pratap Narain Singh Deo v. Shrinivas Sabata and 
Other, AIR 1976 S.C. P. 222 
15. Section 2 (1) (g) . 
13^ 
Clause (c) of 'section 4(1) which deals with 
compensation for permanent partial disablement has re-
mained the same after amendments. It means the compen-
sation payable for permanent partial disablement shall 
be that portion of the amount payable for permanent total 
disablement under the new system as would correspond to 
the i^ercentage of loss of earning capacity specified in 
part-II of schedule I in respect of that injury or as 
determined by the Commissioner in case of non-schedule 
injuries. 
In order to find out the amount of compensation in 
cases of permanent partial disablement, it would be neces-
sary to calculate the amoxint of compensation in case of 
permanent total disablement with reference to the age of 
the injured workman, his monthly wages multiplied by re-
levant factor as indicated in schedule IV and then amount 
so obtained shall be determined in proportion to loss 
of earning capacity of the injured workman as specified 
16 
in part II of schedule I in respect of injury in (juestion. 
Explanation 1 to 5.4(1} v(c) further provides that where 
more injuries than one are caused by the same accident the 
amount of compensation payable under this head shall be 
aggregated but it shall not be more than what would have 
been payable in the case of permanent total disablement. 
16. Goswami, V.G. l,abour & Industrial Laws, P. 405 
13.S 
In assessing the loss of earning capacity in case of 
non-schedule injuries the medical practioner shall have 
due regard to the loss of earning capacity for different 
17 
injuries specified in schedule I. 
18 
In l-lxecutive Engineer, P. W.D. (B & R.) Udaipur case / 
a driver of the appellant was awarded compensation by 
the commissioner for workmen's compensation of Rs.4,800/-
per injuries suffered during the course of employment 
due to accident resulting, in head injuries and a broken 
collor bone the appellant challenged the award on the 
ground that tnere was no permanent partial disablement, 
there was no loss of earning capacity and the workman 
continued in the service and earned the same emolumenits. 
The Rajasthan High Court held that the Workman's 
Compensation *^t provide a security to workman who sus-
tains partial incapacity resulting in the earning capacity. 
In a welfare state, the protection afforded to a workman 
cannot be allowed to rest on the mercies of the employer. 
If the employer do so, it is commendable, but the workman 
still has a stake in his employment which is guaranteed 
to him under the «ct. Therefore, the loss in the earning 
capacity has to be calculated in terms of the permanent 
partial disability to which the workman has been subjected, 
17. section 4(l)(c)(iii) 
18. .. Executive Engineer,P,W,D,(B&R)Udaipur v. Naraln Lai, 
(1978) I lA^.J. 142 (Raj.) 
13h 
19 
In Samlr U. parlkh , the Bombay High Court observed 
that "the percentage of loss of earning capacity stated 
against the injuries in part-II of schedule I of this Act 
is only the minimum to be presumed in each case and the 
applicant is entitled to prove that the loss of earning 
capacity was more than the minimum so prescribed. 
The Commissioner is therefore, empowered to come 
to his own conclusion with regard to the loss of earning 
capacity in each case on the basis of the evidence led 
before him", 
20 
In Mohammad Koya, The Kerala H i ^ Court held that 
section 4 of the Act is mandatory and the commissioner 
can grant compensation prescrived by statute even though 
less compensation than what is admissible is claimed. 
4- COMPENSATION FOR TEMPORARY DISABLEMENT; 
Temporary disablement can be either total or partial. 
If the total disablement caused by the injury is of tem-
porary nature it is temporary total disablement. If the 
injury reduces the earning capacity of a workman in relation 
to the employment in which he had been at the time of the 
accident resulting in such disablement it is temporary 
21 
partial disablement. For the purpose of assessment of 
i;:^. Samir U.parikh v. Sikandar zahiruddin, (I984)ii LL. J. QQ(Rr>fn ] 
20. Mohammad Koya v. Balan^ (1987)11 LL.J.86(Ker.) . > 
21. Section 2(1) (g) 
13. 
ot compensation it Is immaterial whether temporary 
disablement Is total or partial. 
Prior to the 1984 amendment the amount o£ can-
penaation payable £or ten^orary disablonent iinder sec-
tion 4(1) (d) was half monthly wages o£ the workman shown 
in column 4 of schedule IV which varies according to the 
particular wage group. But after the amendment of the 
section 4(1) (d) the compensation now payable to a tempo-
rarily disabled workman is equalent to a sum of 25% of 
the monthly wages of the workman. The first such payment 
becomes due on the sixteenth day (i) from the date of dis-
ablement where such disablement lasts for a period of 
twenty-eight days or more,or after the expiry of waiting 
period of three days from the date of disablement where 
disablement lasts for a period of less then twenty eight 
days. Thereafter the payment will be made in half monthly 
instalments during the entire period of disablement or 
22 
during a period of five years whichever is shorter. The 
amount of any payment which the workman has received from 
the employer by way of compensation prior to receipt of 
any lump sum or half monthly payment shall be deducted from 
such lump sum or of the first half monthly payment as the 
case may be. The half monthly payments shall-in no case 
exceed the amount, if any, by which half the amount of 
monthly wages of the workman before the accident exceeds 
22. ejection 4(2) (i) U (ii) 
13S 
half the amount of such wages which he is getting 
23 
after the accident. Any payment by employer for 
medical treatment shall not be deducted in Manvtbhai' & 
24 
Co. Bombay case^ Bombay High Court held that if a workman 
has received any amount by way of compensation except 
allowance towards medical treatment during a period of 
disablement prior to the receipt of the first half 
jnonthly payments, such amount will be deducted from the 
half monthly payment and it was further observed that 
where an applicant dies during compensation 
proceeding the application may be continued by his heirs. 
D. PUNISHMENT FOR DEFAULTi 
Section 4-A of the Act makes provision for the 
payment of compensation and penalty for default. The 
compensation shall be paid as soon as it falls due. 
However, if the employer accepts the liability partialy, 
the amount of compensation to that extent of partial 
liability must be paid provisionaly to the workman or 
shall be deposited with the Commissioner, The workman 
may accept the amount provisionaly but in no way it 
25 
will affect his right to make any further claim. 
2 3, Proviso (a) 6c (b) to Section 4(2) 
2 4, Manubhai & Co, Bombay v. Shree Babjee,AIR 1970 
Bomb, 267 
2 5. Section 4-A (1) & (2) 
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Tt\& employer is bound to make provisional 
payment of any amount based on the extent of liability 
he accepts within one month from the date it fell due. 
If he defaults the conunissioner may impose interest 
of six per cent per annum on the amount due. In 
addition if the commissioner feels that there is no 
justfication for delay a further sum not exceeding 50/i 
of due amount/ shall be recovered from the employer by 
26 
way of penalty, 
27 
In pratap Narain Singh Deo Case - It was held 
by the supreme Court that it was the duty of the appel-
lant/ under section 4-A(l) of the Act, to pay the com-
pensation at the rate provided by section 4 as soon 
as the personal injury was caused to the respondent. 
He failed to do so. He did not even make a provisional 
payment and taken the false pleas that the respondent 
was a casual contractor and that the accident occured 
because of his negligence. He paid no heed to the res-
pondent's personal approach for obtaining the compensa-
tion. It will be recalled that the respondent was 
driven to the necessity of making an application to 
the commissioner for settling the claim/ and even there 
the appellant raised a frivolous objection as to the 
26. Section 4 -A (3) 
27. supra note 14 
1^0 
jurisdiction of the commissioner and prevailed on the 
respondent to tile a memorandum of agreement settling 
the claim for a sum which was so grossly inadequate 
that it was rejected by the Commissioner, In 
these facts and circumstances« we have no doubt that 
the Commissioner was fully Justified in making an order 
for the payment of interest and the penalty, 
28 
In Superintending Engineer, K,E.B. Hubli/ the 
Calcutta High Court held that if the compensation id not 
paid within one month from the due date, the commissioner 
may in his discretion direct payment of simple interest 
at the rate of six percent per annum in addition to the 
amount of arrears. The date of payment of compensation 
falls due on the date of accident. 
The /ict places the entire liability to pay com-
pensation on employer*- The workman must be compensated 
according t<b the statutory provisions for injury which 
he suffered during employment. The compensation should 
be adequate and prompt and if the employer defaults he 
should be punished. The workman in distress can not wait 
for long. 
28, Superintending Engineer, K.E«B.,Hubli v, Kadappa 
Mallappa, (1984) I LL.J. 179 (Karnataka) 
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CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS 
Injury is common in all societies, injury generally 
results in physical disability and deprivation against 
which injured person needs some sort of future security. 
Earlier it was given by the families of the Injured person 
or by charitable organisations Industrialisation carried 
with it the Inseparable features of accidents and occupa-
tional health hazards. Mechanization and chemicalisation 
of industry have further increased the risk of industrial 
hazards. Workers who play a pivotal role in the progress 
and development of the country need protection against 
these accidents. Provisions for safety devices to be used 
in industrial establishments have been included in various 
labour laws. But inspite of that accidents do occur partly 
due to the absence of adequate safeguards against dangerous 
machinery and partly due to the carelessness and negligence 
of the workers. The accidents and occupational diseases 
are frightening. The physical, psychological, financial 
and social costs of industrial accidents^to workers and 
their families, to industry and to society as a whole are 
tremendous. 
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Thus all along with physical safety the workers 
necessarily need some sort of future financial security 
from want and deprivation from the society to which 
he serves risking his own life, /^ ll the industrialised 
societies responded to this need by enacting compensation 
laws. The compensation system granting disablement and 
dependent benefits was the first step towards social 
security all over the world. 
Under the Indian workmen's Canpensation Act,1923 
the employer's liability to pay compensation arises only 
if personal injury is caused to the workman by accident 
"arising out of and in the course of employment". The 
Act imposes a strict liability and the employer is made 
statutorily obliged to pay to tiie injured employee,com-
pensation as stipulated under the law. In its nature, 
the employer's statutory liability vests, in the employee 
and dependants, a corresponding right to claim stipulated 
amount ot compensation, i.)rovlded the amw rlghit had not 
been negated on account of the workman's own fault under 
conditions prescribed by the Act. vjhere the workman has 
contributed to the accident by being intoxicated by drinks 
or drugs or has omitted to observe safety requirements, 
the right to recover compensation is not available. Again, 
where the accident has not caused any disability result-
ing in reduction of earning capacity the right is held 
14:^  
non-existenc, even If there had been an accident. Lio 
also, if the accident and consequent injury has not 
lasted for more than three days requiring medical 
attention and had not resulted In disablement of 
defined description, the employer is not liable for 
the payment of statutory compensation, i^ xcept under 
the circumstances which absolve the employer of his 
liability to pay he is liable for the payment of sta-
tutory compensation. 
The employer's liability is for personal 
Injury caused to the workman. Personal injury does 
not only mean physical or bodily injury but includes 
even a nervous shock, a mental injury or strain which 
causes a chill. It is a term wider than the bodily 
injury and includes occupational diseases. The Act 
envisages that the employer is not to be held liable, 
unless the injury results from the accident. /accident 
means an untoward event which is unexpected or under-
signed or a mishap unlocked for. 
The complexity of industrial occupations and 
the increasing use of machinery for production exposed 
the workman to unavoidable risks. The causes of the 
industrial injuries were conceived to be largely engi-
neering and physical. /accidents may be due to faulty 
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instructions in machine operations^ inadequate plant 
safety rules# poor selection or use of manpower, poor 
discipline,the workers lack of concentration, the mental 
or physical unfitness of the worker and supervisor. 
To lessen the chances of accidents major emphasis was 
given to safety training and education of the employees 
and supervisors. 
The statutory liability of the employer arises 
where the workman is injured by accident and the same 
arises "out of and in the course of employment". 
Workman who is Injured in the course of his 
employment wjuld be entitled to compensation only if 
the accident has arisen out of his employiuent, that is 
to say, if the accident is due to the employment. In 
testing the case from that point or view tlie word 
"employment" is not to be defined in a narrow manner 
by reference only to the duties of the workman but the 
character, conditions, incidents and special risk 
II 
involved will have to be taken into consideration. 'Ihe 
course of the employed" emphasises that there must be a 
casual connection between the employment and the acci-
dental injury. This casual connection may be direct 
indirect, proximate or remote, A workman is considered 
to be acting in the course of his employment when he is 
engaged in doing something he was employed to do or 
Kfi 
when he is doing something in discharge of a duty of 
his employer directly or indirectly imposed on him by 
his contract of service. After an initial period of 
narrow interpretation, the phrase "arising out of and 
in the course employment" was interpreted by the judi-
ciary to mean not merely the time-factor or the place 
factor, but the facts and circumstances of each case. 
The approach was that unless under the statutory excep-
tion the employer is exempted,the right of the employee 
stands and the compensation is payable. 
Though the employment of the workman begins when 
he has reached the place of employment and does not con-
tinue after he nas left tlie place of employment, the 
employer's premises are deemed, by a course of liberal 
inter^reudtions by the judiciary, to extend to areas 
which the workman pass and re-pass while going to the 
place of work and leaving for home. In other words there 
could be some reasonable extension of botJj time and place 
in which the workman may be regarded as in the course of 
his employment for entitling the workman for compensation. 
'^ workman who suffers from an accident during transit 
undertaken on behalf of his employer but out of his 
ordinary place of work is covered by the pharase 
"arising out of and in the course of employment". If a 
workman is under no obligation to use a vehicle owned by 
the employer and it was for him to decide, it can not be 
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said that the accident arose in the course of his 
employment. If the accident had occured on account 
of a risk which is an incident of the employment, the 
claim for compensation must succeed,unless of course, 
the workman had exposed himself to "an added peril" by 
his imprudent or deliberate act. In the case of death 
caused by accident the burden rests upon the claimant 
to prove that the accident arose out of and in the 
course of employment. This caveat renders the liberal 
interpretation mostly ineffective, since it often happens 
that a claim does not succeed where the accident has 
happened just outside the premises in spite of the doc-
trine of "notional extension oi employer's premises". 
Briefly the words "in the course of his employ-
ment" may be said to cover the whole of the time a work-
man is carrying out tlie duties required of him as inci-
dental to his contract of service. 
besides bodily injury, compensation is also 
payable in the case of certain occu^.ational diseases, 
which have been mentioned in schedule III of the ^ ct. 
If a workman contacts any of the disease mentioned in 
the schedule, the disease will be seen as a personal 
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of 
employment, Ihe otate and Central Goveriiincnts are autho-
rised to ada any number of diseases to the list of the 
diseases. 
14 V 
The compensation is not a solatiujn to the in-
jured .of: thw-^epeodant^^but something to replace the 
actual loss suffered. The quantum payment depend on the 
nature of the injury and the consecjuent loss in tiie 
earning capacity. The percentage of loss in earning capa-
city is pre-determined in the case of disablement of de-
fined category. It may be recalled that the compensation 
was ijayable in case of monthly wages not exceeding Rs. 1000/-. 
However for the puirposes of coverage of more workmen the 
wage limit has been removed by the amendment Act of 1984 on 
the recommendation of National Commission on Labour 1969. 
Employer has to pay compensation as soon as it falls due. 
Where the employer does not accept liability for compensa-
tion to the extent , it is being claimed the Act makes pro-
vision for payment ot provisional compensation. The Act also 
makes provision-for penalty in case of default of the payment 
of compensation. 
It is clear from above discussion that the main 
purpose of the /^ ct is to provide for some prompt compensation 
to the injured workman \iho ordinarily can not afford to go 
to law and who even if he went tJiere, might well find his 
claim rejected on one or another of several grounds. The /ict 
therefore goes near to eliminating all enquiries as to who 
was to blame for accident causing the injury and on the 
basis tnat destruction of life or limb is one of the normal 
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hazards of industrial employment which are not generally 
attributable to the fault of any particular person, 
provides for some compensation to be given to the injured 
workman whenever an industrial injury is sustained except 
in a few extreme cases. 
The principal objective of the law is only to fix 
the liability upon the employer for payment of statutory 
compensation to his own workers who suffered disablement 
out of industrial accident. On account of its limited' 
objective the compensation law suffers from the lacunae, 
both in its nature and in its operational efficacy, to be 
an effective social security system. 
rt weak feature of the Act is that it places the 
entire liability for com^/ensation on the employer (there 
being no onligation on the part of the employer to insure 
his liability). A small employer in many cases finds it 
difficult to pay compensation in the extent of a heavy 
liability arising out of a fatal accident. The pre-
determined percentage of loss of earning capacity,relating 
it to the nature of injury and the classification of dis-
ablement in terms of permanent and temporary,do not leave 
much scope to administer social justice & enough recompense 
for the loss actually suffered either by the individual wor-
ker or his family.The nexus fixed between earning capacity 
and current wages,do not take into account, the disparity 
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between money wages and real wages. itic omission of 
a realistic assessment of the workman's future earning 
capacities by the job prospects and relative life span 
he can serve renders the concept of earning capacity 
notional and the compensation illusory. The fixation 
of the quantum measure, without taking into account 
the requirement of dependant liability of the workman 
concerned is both arbitrary in practice and works in-
justice to the worker and his family. 
Delays and difficulties in getting compensation 
under the net are not unknown. Employers of smaller 
industries attempts to avoid payment of compensation by 
one means or the other. In bigger companies minor 
injuries often go unreported. Delay occurs in the dis-
posal of application, as judicial officers stick to the 
judicial formalities rather than observing the essence 
and spirit of the Act speedily. In seasonal factories 
often full payment is not made. In cases of contract 
labour, contractors, sometimes pay a smaller sum than 
what is due under the /ict and take receipt for full 
amount, and in some cases compensation is not paid at 411, 
There are no agencies available to render legal or 
other assistance to the workers in securing compensation 
due to them. 
loO 
In the application and administration of law, 
there Is still room for the intrusion of tiie doctrine 
of "added peril" to counter-act the benefit conferred 
to the workman and permit the employer to escape from 
liability to pay. If a workman is injured in anyindus-
trial accident and suffers partial disablement because 
of that, no provision has been made under the law against 
retrenching him nor has the law laid down for the pay-
ment of compensation for his retrenchnient on this ground. 
This is a serious anomaly which puts the injured 
workman to greater difficulties. 
rtCt makes no provision for medicdl care ana 
treatment which is the greatest need of the worker when 
he neets with an accident. There is also no provision 
for rehabilitation to restore the loss in his earning 
capacity. The system of lump sum payment is also not 
satisfactory in that it runs the risk of the amount being 
frittered away. 
i\ claim petition gets entangled in judicial 
proceedure ones the Cocnmissioner• s award comes under 
chalenge, and it suffers from both litigailLty and delay, 
duch are tJie difficulties and defects of workmen's com-
pensation system. /attempts to find solutions may go a 
long way in improving matters. But the problem needs 
consideration in terms of the broad social and economic 
environment, m recent times; as judicial approach becomes 
Ibi 
more sociological, a welcome change is visible. But that 
can in no way be a consolation ior a statutory change for 
integrated social security. 
To effect changes and make the ^ct more responsive 
to the changing needs it is suggested that there should be 
provision for compulsory insurance against the employer's 
liability to pay compensation ior accidents to the workmen 
on the lines of Public Liability Insurance />.ct, 1991. It 
is also necessary to ensure that the cash compensation is 
adequate with reference to the cost of living and the size 
of the family of the workers. The definition of a "depen-
dant" under the Act can also be made broader and clerical 
and supervisory staff should also be entitled to compensa-
tion. 
The availability of compensation should be automatic 
and all accidents whether fatal or non-fatal should be 
immediately reported to the labour commissioner followed 
at an early date by a statement showing tlie amount of com-
pensation paid for each accident, and v/here liability is 
disclaimed, a brief statement of reasons in support of it 
should also be made. 
It is also desirable that free legal aid at the cost of 
the state should be provided to the injured workman. 
The inspecting staff should be empowered to 
take up cases of workers who have not been paid due 
compensation by the employers. The administrative 
15:, 
proceedure should be simplified and there should 
quick disposal of the cases of compensation. 
Provision should be made for constant moni-
toring of safety measures taken by the employers for 
the safety of workers from accident and injuries. 
The recommendation of National Commission on 
labour with respect to the payment of compensation 
should also be taken into consideration. It recommended 
that a scheme of central fund for workmen's compensation 
should be evolved. All employer's should pay to this 
fund a percentage of total wage as montJily contribution 
to cover the cost or tiie benefit and of adminiytration. 
The fund should be controlled by Employees citate Insu-
rance Corporation and periodic cash payments may be made 
by the corporation to injured workers and their depen-
dants in the same way as Employee State Insurance bene-
fits are paid. Medical care should be provided by the 
corporation to injured workers, omall employers may not 
find it difficult to pay such contributions since these 
will not be collected: in bulk. This will also eli-
minate evasioii of the law. The adjudication of claims 
can be entrusted to the tripartite regional board set-
up under E.j.I, ^ct in various states. 
The commission further pointed out that under 
the existing provisions of law, while an ablebodied 
worker could claim and obtain compensation for being 
15: 
surplus/ an injured or handicapped workman is thrown 
out without adequate payment because accident or 
disease has incapacitated him. This leyal anomaly 
requires to be removed, /i worker should be entitled 
to higher compensation for disablement resulting from 
industrial accidents. It shouiti be in the form of sub-
sistance allowance in case v^ here the worker remains 
unemployed because of the disablement. Tiiis will indi-
rectly induce the employer to provide suitable employ-
ment to such a workman and, what is more important, to 
take adequate care to prevent such contingency. 
out these recommendations, which might have 
gone a long way in ameliorating the conditions of the 
Industrial Workers, are still waiting in the files for 
implementation. This is a cruel joke on a social 
welfare state. 
Workmen's compensation is not to be thought of 
as merely a way of disposing of a private quarrel 
between employer and employee about a personal injury, 
it is not a branch of strict liability in tort, it is 
not simply a substitute for common law litigation bet-
ween parties to a personal contest over private rights. 
.Workmen's compensation is one segment or department in 
the overall pattern of income insurance, which includes 
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employment Insurance* sickness and disability insurance 
and old age and survivor's insurance. Means to achieve 
this goal will continue to differ in terms of the con-
temporary social* political and economic thought/ the 
institutional rigidities* the economic pressures and 
similar other context variables. The means may differ 
from system to system and at the tiroes within the system 
but goal is the sames The elimination of disability and 
provision for the dependents of those killed or disabled 
in the community as a v^ole. Only then we can give a 
measure of Justice to toiling labourers. 
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